Incorporation of crime intelligence-led policing in South Africa police operation: is South African police getting it right

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to investigate the incorporation of the ILP approach in the research area. It assesses if this approach has been incorporated into crime fighting in the police station's areas which form part of the research. The research was based in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The aim was to establish the incorporation of ILP in the day-to-day operation of the police, and 8 participants were drawn between the CIO and OPO stationed in four districts (Mkhanyakude, Zululand, uThukela, and Amajuba). The participants included two former police officers (one former Commander of CI and a former Station Commander) who were used to validate information by active police officers. One District Commander was also interviewed. Qualitative research methodology was followed to conduct the research and a purposive method of data gathering was used targeting police officers who work in crime intelligence units and those who have authority over the operational members of the SAPS. They provided information that was used to determine the incorporation of the ILP in the day-to-day operation of the SAPS in the research area. The paper found that this policing approach has not been incorporated into some components of policing in the research area. The major identified stumbling in the incorporation is the structural arrangement of the Crime Intelligence Unit which does not sync with crime combating at the station level.

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Introduction

The Civilian Secretariat for the Police is working towards the amendments of the Police Act. This amendment includes a section on Crime Intelligence. The inclusion of that section can be view as a step forward in the consolidation of the implementation of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) in the country. This section of the draft bill covers the reporting lines of the division, its functions, and the process of obtaining security clearance.

Policing approach anticipated by the amendments of the Police Act inform both crime prevention and investigation functions of the police. Involvement of intelligence in policing makes SAPS to be more intelligence led in their fight against ever increasing crime and its trends in the country. This is also an indication that the police are becoming serious or improving how ILP can be used to improve crime approach. ILP has an edge on the previously adopted policing approaches in that it is proactive in that it attempts to predict and respond to crime before it arises, rather than waiting for a crime to happen. This affords the police an opportunity to plan their operations based on intelligence provided by crime intelligence officials. It is also important to note that this approach, when well adopted will also improve working relationship between operational police officials and crime intelligence officials.

This paper aims at investigating the incorporation of ILP in the daily operations of the South African Police Service (SAPS). The objective thereof is to assess progress made in implementing ILP to inform policing and answer the question: has SAPS succeeded to incorporate ILP in policing activities. The paper can be useful in informing policy developers and implementers to improve on the incorporation intelligence in everyday policing in the country.
The upside of this policing model is that it strategically informs the deployment of police resources to areas that are affected by high crime rates. Such areas pose high crime risk in a particular station area. This can have an impact to the overall crime rate in the country. To an extent, this policing model makes sense because it allows the police to deploy scarce resources more strategically to areas of highest risk.

The downside might be that it can also lead to policing in the absence of a criminal predicate, which makes room for speculative policing of nebulous, ill-defined threats. It has also been established in other countries that ILP can also lead to racially charged profiling of certain social groups that are perceived to be more likely to commit crime. This can be prevented by ensuring that information collected should be verified by a different crime intelligence official in the process of converting such information to intelligence.

The discussion above highlight importance of ILP in the fighting crime. It shows gains that can be made by South African Police Service (SAPS) upon proper adoption of this policing approach. The model is also useful in both crime prevention and crime investigation which are both main functions of the SAPS. Successes and problems the model might face in South Africa (SA) cannot be well identified because there are no studies that investigate the implementation and adoption of this policing model. The absence of such studies was identified in this research as the problem facing this policing approach in the country in general and particularly in the research area. This research will assist in pointing where problems exist and coming up with recommendations of how to mitigate such problem.

The paper is organised as follows: following an introduction part is the literature review which gives in-depth discussion on ILP and crime intelligence. This section is followed by research methodology which covers how information was collected and analysed. Then is discussion of the findings, recommendations, and conclusion.

**Literature Review**

**Crime Intelligence-Led Policing: Pros And Cons**

Ratcliffe (2016) states that “Intelligence-led policing emphasizes analysis and intelligence as pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that prioritizes crime hotspots, repeat victims, prolific offenders, and criminal groups. It facilitates crime and harm reduction, disruption and prevention through strategic and tactical management, deployment, and enforcement.”. The author further asserts that this model refers to a management framework for criminal intelligence and planned operational police work, in which intelligence is the foundation for defining priorities, strategic and operational objectives in the prevention and suppression of crime and other security threats. ILP also includes making the appropriate decisions on operational police work and actions, the rational engagement of available human resources and allocation of material and technical resources.

Kelling and Bratton (2006: 5) add to the explanation provide by Ratcliffe by stating that this approach is a crime fighting based on and guided by effective intelligence gathering and analysis and has a potential to be the most important law enforcement innovation of the 21st century. South Africa as part of the world should also from time to time engage approaches and measures employed by other countries to fight crime. It is important to identify progressive approaches that can ensure community is safe from being crime victims. Involving intelligence in the fight and combating crime can play a major role.

ILP model provides the 4-i model (intent, interpret, influence and impact) which is helpful in explaining the roles and the relationship between key actors of the ILP concept: the criminal environment, the criminal intelligence analyst, and the police decision-maker. All four “i” components must be in place and function properly if ILP is to work to its potential. The model places emphasis on the relationship between the criminal analysis and the decision-makers.

The decision-makers (police managers) task, direct, advise and guide the criminal intelligence analysts. Firstly, the decision-makers must ensure that their intentions are explained and understood. Secondly, the analysts interpret the criminal environment, and thirdly, influence the decision-makers with the analysis findings. Based on these findings, the decision-makers (fourthly) impacts on the criminal environment through strategic management, action plans, investigations, and operations (Ratcliffe, 2016).

The author further states that “Intelligence-led policing is a business model for policing that can incorporate areas of policing activity that are not related to crime per se but are still significant problems for communities and police agencies. With this evolution, intelligence-led policing is moving to becoming the ‘all crimes, all hazards, all-harms’ business approach that is sought by many in policing”. Riots and unrest can be provided as examples of what Ratcliffe (2016) is arguing about regarding all harm and all hazards that can be prevented by ILP.

The intelligence-led policing was a turning point for the Unit Beat Policing in 1967 in the United Kingdom. The introduction of the analyst who collated and evaluated collected information by patrol officers became a milestone in developing intelligence-led policing. The process allowed for the mapping of crime trends and patterns which gave police officials an advantage in how to combat crime (James, 2013).

Sheptycki, in Coyne and Bell (2011), states that intelligence has become increasingly vital in this age where the role of the police has changed from a simplistic response and enforcement activity to one of managing human security risk. He further argues that, in
this evolving paradigm shift, intelligence can be used to reduce the impact of strategic surprise from evolving criminal threats and environmental change.

So, in order to be a step ahead of the criminals, the police need to generate crime intelligence. But, before the generation of crime intelligence, it is crucial for every police official to know what crime intelligence means. In order to simplify this matter, the following definitions of the term “crime intelligence” from two sources have been used. In terms of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994 crime intelligence means intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders.

Zinn (2010) defines crime intelligence as information about crime that has been systematically processed into a form that can be readily accessed and used to track down criminals and combat crime. It is clear from the above definitions that crime intelligence is intelligence about criminal activities. Crime intelligence, therefore, is generated to prevent, combat, or investigate criminal activities. Intelligence products which are used to prevent, combat, or investigate crime are the end results of pieces of information which are collected from various sources of information.

Carter (2008) distinguishes between the different definitions of intelligence led policing. According to him there is an academic and operational definition of the term. Different academic definitions were listed in the preceding paragraphs. He states that the operational definition of intelligence led policing is, “The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats”.

He goes further to identify six critical components which form the basis of the definition. These critical components are, collection, analysis, crime, and conditions that contribute to crime, actionable intelligence, tactical responses to threats, and strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.

For ILP to be a success, it is important to ensure that information is gathered and analysed properly.

Gathering and analysing gathered information to produce crime intelligence

It is important to note that information is the fundamental starting point for building intelligence to combat crime. Criminal intelligence is the product of process which derived from information that has been collected and analysed to prevent crime from happening as well as investigating crime that had already taken place (Ratcliffe, 2016).

Mashiloane (2014) adds that information for the purpose of developing crime intelligence is collected from various sources and can be categorised as both open and closed sources of information. Open sources consist of all readily available information to the public and easily accessible. On the other end, closed sources refer to sources of information which are not accessible to the public and not readily available.

Both these sources need to be handled carefully to ensure that the process of converting such information to crime intelligence can yield results. The proper handling will ensure that intelligence can be used by the police to combat crime and criminal groups. Intelligence can also be used to inform the distribution of resources to the places where resources are needed more. This therefore places a huge responsibility to crime intelligence official to gather and analyse gathered information. The use of both human and system plays an important role in ensuring accuracy of the intelligence as product of gathered information. Emphases should not be based on system only as reliable option for information gathering.

This sentiment was also echoed by George & Kline (2006) who argued that the application of humans for intelligence gathering and analysis (as opposed to machine intelligence gathering processes) remains an essential component of a comprehensive strategic intelligence system. The advantages derived from effective human-gathered intelligence information/system remains constant throughout all phases.

If the use of human in information gathering and analysis is achieved, it will improve relationship between information gatherers and informers. Successful usage of such information will motivate informers to give more information which can be used to fight crime. When it comes to analysing the information, that can be done by both human and system to ensure accuracy of produced intelligence.

Collection activities by the gatherers produces information not intelligence, as a result, information collected must undergo processing and exploitation before it can be regarded as intelligence. Human intelligence involves gathering of information by means of interpersonal contact rather than by technical means such as signal intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement, and signature intelligence (Girod, 2014). According to Dahl (2013), scholars and practitioners of intelligence agree that failures/deficiencies in gathered and analysed intelligence information occurs, because agencies and analysts failed to understand the signals and warnings which were right in front of them from the onset.

Heuer & Pherson (2015) summarised this discussion on the importance of involving both human and system on analysing gathered information, by positing that analysts should understand the functions performed by various types of analytical techniques which include the following: structured brainstorming; cross-impact matrix; key assumptions check; indicators; analysis of competing hypotheses; pre-mortem analysis and structured self-critique; and ‘What if?’ analysis.
For intelligence to be accurate, environment also plays a pivotal role. Clark (2013) has an opinion that prediction importance lies in the assessment of the environment that will shape future events and the status of the target model. If the analyst has assessed the environment properly for threats the results would have served the customer/user of intelligence well. Analysis is a set of methodologies and cognitive processes which ignites everything else in the intelligence environment. Taking all above factors regarding the success of converting information to intelligence, it is also important to highlight some issues that can hinder such success and corrupt information. These factors that will make information not to be able to provide accurate intelligence that can be used to produce desired outcomes.

Gill and Phythian (2012) pointed out that crime intelligence shortcomings were seldom made by the gatherers of the raw information. However, such were occasionally made by the professionals that produce the analysis reports, but most often these failings/deficiencies are perpetrated by the decision makers who make use of the collected/analysed intelligence information. Accordingly, the sources of intelligence shortcomings are primarily located at the level of decision-makers; followed by the level of analysis; and only lastly, at the level of actual collection.

These authors argue further that all analysts involved in the process must properly understand the environment within which the gatherers of intelligence information operate and develop a good working relationship with the gatherers.

The intelligence cycle begins with planning and direction stage in which the clients put forward the requirements. The next stage that follows is the collection stage in which the collection of raw information takes place before analysis and dissemination of information. The handlers of human sources would then have to put a plan in place to identify the possible suspects of the act by using informers (Phythian, 2013). Buckley (2014) adds that tactical crime intelligence is intelligence regarding a specific criminal event that can be used by operational units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations, and provide for officer safety.

Smith (1997) argues that information has always been available to the law enforcement agencies, but it was never developed. It was recorded on the police records books but not exposed to analysis for utilisation by the entire police agency. Only a limited number of police officials knew about this information, which, if utilised properly, could benefit the entire police agency to prevent crime. Thus, available information was not used in a coordinated manner.

Based on the discussion above, it is important to highlight the importance of the use of intelligence or ILP in crime fighting. This will point out why such approach can differ from traditional approaches of crime fighting.

**The benefits of intelligence-led policing in fighting crime**

One of the most important advantages of adopting ILP as a crime fighting approach is that it allows for a forward-looking and proactive approach to entire policing. It has been successfully applied in recent years in several countries around the world to address serious crime and transnational threats. This therefore has encouraged the development of the ILP concept from being mainly applied to countering organized crime to a more general strategic business model to address a wide variety of policing problems at the local, regional, and national levels.

This development is directly related to the search for policing methods that would allow the police to have a greater impact on crime, crime developments and the social harm of criminality with limited resources and at times of increased demand for accountability. In recent years, demand for police services and response have outpaced the resource availability of the police, raising the claim for prioritisation and increased efficiency of police resources. At the same time, political and public expectations of accountability have been heightened.

ILP has been presented as an option to address this, since it offers the rationale and the tools to analyse and assess threats to the public, allowing for more documented, transparent, and accountable decision-making procedures to direct existing resources where they are most needed.

According to European External Action Service (2013), the importance of introducing ILP is apparent in times of budgetary and resource restrictions, each responsible individual and organisation must identify priorities to tackle major problems. To assist in prioritisation, decisions must be made based on facts and intelligence, the basis of all of which is information. ILP can therefore contribute to optimising the allocation of resources and concentrate efforts in a more structured manner. This helps to cope with increased sophistication and operational agility of criminals to subvert law and order.

ILP also provides an opportunity of risk identification and management which is an integral part of modern policing. A properly functioning ILP approach to data and information gathering and analysis allows for identifying and assessing risks, including for major events, geographic areas, types of crime, social harm, serious criminals, and criminal networks. According to Ratcliffe (2016) studies suggest that while, in general, increasing numbers of police officers can be effective, it is more useful to consider how officers are deployed. Random patrol is not an effective tactic to reduce crime, but more focused tactics that are drawn from an evidence base (a fundamental component of ILP) can have crime prevention benefits beyond the amount of time officers spend at a crime hotspot.

The analysis of crime intelligence allows law enforcement to determine pro-active crime response. It allows them to identify criminal groups in their fields and to understand them. Once criminal groups are identified and familiar with their habits, law enforcement...
authorities can start assessing current crime trends and obstructing the development of perceived future criminal activity (Victor, Chika & Innocent, 2019).

Intelligence provides the knowledge to base decisions and select suitable investigative targets. Whilst it supports investigations, monitoring operations and prosecution, the use of crime intelligence analyses provides law enforcement agencies with the ability to efficiently manage resources, budgets and carry out their crime prevention responsibilities (Zheng, Tao & Rieckermann, 2018).

Next discussion will highlight how intelligence driven policing has been used by police agencies in some countries. This will in a way indicates the importance of the adoption of this policing approach.

**Implementation of intelligence based/intelligence-led policing**

The use of intelligence in policing is not a new thing, intelligence was used differently by different countries, and this was done for different purposes as an approach/strategy for crime fighting. According to Schreier (2009), in the United States of America (USA), intelligence was used to fight organised crime. In some European countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), it was used for “political policing” which was to suppress political opponents of the state, which was also the case in the Republic of South Africa. Intelligence emerged as a vital tool in all policing matters after the recognition of the inability of the traditional reactive model of policing to cope with the inexorable rise in crime in the UK.

Zinn (2010) states that the intelligence led policing model is already in place in South Africa, but it has yet to be fully and comprehensively adopted. He is also of the opinion that, if an ILP model was accepted by the SAPS as the core of all policing activities, it would introduce a more scientific approach towards fighting crime and ensure the most efficient and cost-effective use of policing resources. The notion is that for ILP to be effective, it should support all police operations. Crime prevention and investigation thereof must be based on all-source information gathering and analysis.

The author further states that in South Africa there is a crime intelligence office at most police stations, and at provincial and national levels. Despite this, most police service members, especially at station level, do not see crime intelligence as a primary policing tool. As a result, the SAPS Crime Intelligence is far from functioning optimally. Schneider (2009) supports this posit by stating that this is not SA’s problem alone, but the discipline of criminal intelligence remains largely misunderstood and under-utilised in most police agencies around the world.

Zinn (2010) states further that the intelligence led policing model is already in place in South Africa, but it has yet to be fully and comprehensively adopted. He is also of the view that, if an intelligence led policing model was accepted by the SAPS as the core of all policing activities, it would introduce a more scientific approach towards fighting crime and ensure the most efficient and cost-effective use of policing resources. This point of view was posited by Petersons (2005), when arguing that “for intelligence to be effective, it should support an agency’s entire operation. Crime prevention and investigation thereof must be based on all-source information gathering and analysis”.

When investigating the implementation of ILP in Somalia, Omar and Miyonga (2017) examined the determinants of crime prevention. They established that analysis of crime trends links unemployment as the major crime cause. To prevent the prevalence of crime, employment development plays a significant role for it provides many accesses to employment opportunities. In a situation where one is engaged positively in an income generating activities, there would be little or no time to engage in criminal activities. This kind of information can only be accessed through information gathering and analysis thereof which is the product of ILP.

It was in the study conducted by Jerome (2020), where it was established that the emergence of mass delinquency, such as cybercrime, has altered the role of investigation as a useful mode of knowledge production. This obsolescence has appeared gradually and can be summarized in four stages, which generates a suspicion about the social relevance of the investigation. It seems that the holistic approach of ILP is adapted to the fight against new forms of crime. The investigation becomes a precision instrument assigned to functions that become more specific. This is a paradigm shift by the approaches to knowledge management of crime control. Cybercrime is emblematic of this shift. This study is based on the criminological review and the delinquency analysis led by the central criminal intelligence service of the national gendarmerie.

The next section of this article deals with method used to gather and analyse the data.

**Research and Methodology**

Literature that was reviewed includes books, journals, articles, newspapers, annual reports, enabling legislation and articles. These form part of the secondary sources of information. Primary sources comprised all transcripts of the interviews.

This is qualitative research and assesses the status of incorporation of ILP and use of intelligence in fighting crime in the province of KZN in four policing districts. A qualitative research method was also followed to collect qualitative data, and such information was only collected in the northern part of KZN. A qualitative approach was followed because the research is premised on a social constructivist paradigm. This paradigm holds the assumption that individuals seek to understand the world in which they live and work (Creswell, 2012).

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An interview guide was developed, and it guided the data collection to ensure that research questions are answered, objectives achieved and cover the aim of the research. Interview guide ensured that there was a structure in the way data was collected whilst ensuring that new concepts that arise during interviews were also captured.

To assist with the compilation of questions that form part of the guide, three people/experts who are in crime intelligence environment were part of formulating questions. The interview guide contained a mixture of questions, and those questions were phrased in the third person to allow participants to speak freely, especially about negative experiences or situations. One-on-one semi-structured, open-ended questions interviews were conducted with police officers in Crime Intelligence Units and Operational officers.

These police officers were, Crime intelligence Branch Commanders and other members were information gatherers and handlers. One former Station Commander, one former Branch Commander in two different areas that were part of the research area, and a District Commander were also interviewed to triangulate information gathered from the officers stationed at crime intelligence branches.

Due to non-willingness of members of Crime Intelligence to participate in the research even after permission by the SAPS was granted, no person from Ladysmith was interviewed or form part of the research. Branch Commander from Newcastle also did not agree to form part of the research.

All interviews were conducted by the author at a time and place convenient to the participants. Handwritten notes were made at the end of each interview to record emergent thoughts and ideas. Interviews ran for approximately one hour, were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim by an audio typist. All participants answered all interview questions. Transcripts were checked against the tape recordings for accuracy and errors by the researcher who conducted the interviews.

Population

The population of the research was police officers involved in intelligence led policing in the research area, that is, Branch commanders, Station commanders, and District commanders. Purposive sampling was used because units/branches that were used for data gathering were identified prior the process took place. The aim was to involve people with experience and were part of crime intelligence in the research area.

Their views can be used to influence policies aimed at improving crime intelligence, provisioning crime prevention and crime combating as well as implementation of ILP. According to Bowen (2005), purposive sampling is used to ensure that quality information about the topic is obtained from the case study. It is not used to maximise numbers but to become saturated with information on the topic.

Data collection

A standardised semi-structured interview schedule was used to gather qualitative data from participants. An interview guide was used to bring structure to the interviews, even though interviews were treated as conversations during which the interviewer drew out detailed information and comments from the respondents. According to Patton (in Rubin and Babbie, 2001), one way to provide more structure to a completely unstructured, informal conversational interview, while maintaining a relative degree of flexibility, is to use the interview guide strategy.

Data analysis

A thematic method was followed to analyse the data. In thematic analysis one looks for patterns that emerge within transcripts (Lebese, 2009). In this article, the themes were formulated before interviews were conducted, while the new themes that emerged from the interviews were also added to the predetermined themes. To ensure that sufficient information was gathered, a set of questions was also formulated although respondents were at liberty to give information beyond the scope of the formulated questions. According to Green and Thorogood (2009), by using data such as discussion notes or transcripts, the researcher can categorise respondents’ accounts in ways that can be summarised.

Data analysis started during the interview stage. Interviews were conducted by the author himself which enabled him to gain an understanding of the meaning of the data. The information on the data recording instrument was transcribed by him, thus assisted to obtain more insight, and understanding of the recorded data. The author then read the transcript several times to familiarise himself with the data.

Findings & Discussion

There were four themes that were identified during data analysis that assisted with assessing the status of adopting ILP and use of intelligence in fighting crime in the research area. These themes are: Understanding of ILP, Handling of crime intelligence (information), Relationship between crime intelligence police officers and operational police officers, and Incorporation of intelligence to daily police operations.
Understanding of ILP

The point of departure regarding data gathering was to find out if those responsible for implementing ILP in the research area do understand what this policing approach is. They were asked to explain, according to their understanding what ILP is. There were different responses provided but what was uncovered is that most of them struggled to explain what this policing approach is.

Some of the responses were, “It is confirmed information which can be followed until it led to justice whosoever must be led to justice. I believe our office is trying to implement it, but we struggle with the station. It is therefore partially implemented. We don’t understand our different roles in the implementation of ILP”. This was an explanation of the approach by one of the CI Branch Commanders. One would expect that this person, as an expert and leader/manager of crime intelligence to have a clear understanding of the approach but that was not the case. The Branch Commander even stated that they don’t even know their different roles in implementing the approach.

Another participant stated that “We as CI give them guideline to say how can a priority crime at that time be neutralized”. This is the explanation from another senior CI official at Branch level. The retired CIO argued that “The police must be led by intelligence. Intelligence clarifies who is involved, groups or individual. It helps the police to follow according to what intelligence has told them. CI must provide information and OPO must act on that information”. This explanation is not far from the role of ILP in policing.

Explanation that was closer to what ILP is, was provided by the retired Station Commander who stated that “Crime Intelligence provides information that could be used in crime prevention and detecting reported crime”. The responses provided above show the difficulties police officials at station level are faced with. They are expected to implement something that they cannot even explain. This can an indication that the approach was never explained to them. It can also mean that there were no workshops before adoption of the approach to explain what it is and roles definition. It therefore becomes difficult to implement something that they cannot explain or understand. It could have assisted if both units were workshoped about this approach and its implementation thereof.

Handling of crime intelligence (information)

When it comes to how intelligence is handled and communicated between Crime Intelligence Officers (CIO) and Operational Police Officers (OPO) until success of such information is achieved, the interviewees from CI were asked who is the person that they work with and give information to at the stations that they serve.

It was established that there was no identified person nor established process/procedure to be followed on how intelligence is communicated/handled between CIU and Police station. Other CIO prefer to give information to the Station Commander as one can expect but others argued that they do not trust Station Commanders with the information. This response is so amazing to say the least. Officers of the same organisation cannot trust each other, how can the community in return trust that organisation. This is a serious problem; it means that CIO can have useful intelligence that could be used to fight crime, but such information cannot be communicated to the Station Commander. The person responsible and bear responsibility for crime combating in a particular area.

An interviewee stated that “Sometimes they are not informed because of the fear that they can leak information”. The issue here is, then what? What happens to such information? Can that information be useful in planning police operations that in the long run can help preventing and combating crime in respective station areas.

Another CI senior official added to this assertion by stating that “sometimes information is there but the problem was, who do you give information to”. Information gathers are sometimes afraid that their identity can be disclosed to criminals which might put their lives in danger when executing their duties. Police therefore decided to play it safe. For a non-police officer, this information was damaging! It indicates political interference on policing that put lives of the citizens in danger to advance political gains. What makes the handling of information to be difficult it’s that in Crime intelligence Section at Provincial Level does not account to the District and Station Commanders. Therefore, the latter two levels of commands cannot hold them accountable for information sharing or not sharing.

This makes CIO untouchable; they only act if instructed by the province. This structural arrangement is problematic and interfere with crime fighting at station level where crime happens. This observation led to a former station commander to be asked how he managed to work with CIO during his tenure. He replied that “I did not know what their work was. The members did not trust them also because they always regard them to be spies. They had all fancy cars that we did not have”. When asked how he assigned them to carry out different tasks, his response was “You sometimes have to use the rank because you are their senior but as a person you also fear for your life...”. This was also affirmed by the District Commander who stated that he also uses his rank for the CIO to do what he wants them to do.

Taking this into consideration one can then suggest that the structural arrangement needs to be adjusted to ensure that station commanders or their representatives can have an amount control over CIO in their area of jurisdiction. This can be done by those responsible for amendment of Police Act. They must also stipulate how information must be handled for the benefit of crime fighting at the station level.
Relationship between crime intelligence police officers and operational police officers

Taking distrust between CIO and Operational Police Officer (OPO) at station level, the next question was to establish the kind of relationship that exist to them in the research area. This done not only to ascertain relationship but to also solicitate what can be done to improve the relationship. The answers to this question vary and the reality of the situation could not be established. For instance, one CIO stated that the relationship was good, another one argued that the relationship is not good because when OPO sees a CIO, they will think that he/she is there to spy on them. This was confirmed by the former station commander who stated that “even when we have a brief before operations, when a CIO arrives, the member will stop talking because the members do not trust CIOs”.

So, it is not only CIO who do not trust OPO with information as discussed in the previous paragraphs, but OPO also do not trust CIO. The distrust is such that they cannot jointly discuss crime operational issue. Problem here is that they jointly are responsible for crime fighting and this conduct is without a doubt compromising the safety of a station area.

Another CIO agreed to that submission when stating that “There is no relationship between CIO and OPO. If CI comes with information but POP does not work on it, such information is useless”. Former CIO highlighted factor that affects relationship between these two units, he posits that “Policing can be improved if there is a trust between these two units. If intelligence say there is gang or syndicate operating in a particular place, OPO must trust you. When OPO conducts operation and do not find anything, they say that CIO was lying. They do not want to get closer to CI because there is this misconception that CI is investigating them”.

Based on the previous discussion on how crime intelligence information is handled, working relationship between CIO and OPO needs to be improved to ensure that services are rendered to the community. Improving relationship between these two units will also ensure successful implementation of ILP. It is also important to state that the role of crime intelligence unit be clarified to ensure successful implementation of ILP. This approach is not adopted, and it does not even seem that it will be implemented because there is no\footnote{Buthelezi, International Journal of Research in Business & Social Science 13(3) (2024), 364-373.} instruction that regulates the implementation thereof. The police are still doing things the old way and each working in silos.

It will also be important to confirm intelligence information that they give to OPO that can be used to inform crime prevention operations. If that is done, there will be trust between the two units and OPO will take CIO seriously and that will deepen relationship and understanding between these units.

Incorporation of intelligence to daily police operations

To ascertain the level of incorporation of crime intelligence in the daily police operations, interviewees were asked to give instances where intelligence was used to fight crime in the research area.

Before one can explain provided answers it is important to start by stating that there is no document or established procedure that give guidance on how to implement ILP in the research area. Each station does whatever it sees necessary and name that implementation of ILP. This approach is not adopted, and it does not even seem that it will be implemented because there is no instruction that regulates the implementation thereof. The police are still doing things the old way and each working in silos.

There is no improvement on how crime prevention is conducted. One can also argue that the organisation is struggling to implement approaches, models or strategies that are adopted from other countries like ILP. Those who are supposed to implement these approaches struggle to conceptualize them. Some approaches are understood at the highest level of an organisation, but implementers are not equipped on how to implement some of the approaches.

When it comes to the integration of intelligence in policing, the police officials in the research area mainly believe, like in the olden days that intelligence can only be used to assist detectives to solve their cases. The implementation of ILP is not part of crime prevention and does not inform crime prevention operations and programs. There was no proof that this approach informs the provision of resources and informs management decisions on how such resources are allocated according to identified crime hotspots. So, the approach does not inform decision making for crime fighting in the research area.

For ILP to be successful, the police must regulate the approach and ensure that they develop a document that will guide the implementation thereof. Other policing approaches such as Sector and Community Policing were regulated, and guidelines roles definitions were provided. This made it easy for police officials to implement such approaches.

Conclusion

This paper succeeded to access the current state of the ILP in the research area, which was the aim of the paper. It uncovered some issues that need to be addressed the ensure proper adoption of this useful policing approach. The major finding was the rigidity of the current structural arrangement of CIO’s accountability which hinders crime fighting at the station level. Another stumbling block in implementing ILP is distrust between major role-player (OPO and CIO). This needs to be addressed going forward for the approach to yield desired results. The research also gave indication of how this approach is used in different countries and the advantage it has over other policing approaches.

Based on the findings as discussed above, the following recommendations can be made:
i. To ensure that police officials responsible for the implementation/actualisation of the ILP know what to do, it is important that workshops regarding this policing approach are held. This will give implementer confidence to implement something that they know and have been workshopped on. ILP is a policing approach borrowed from other parts of the world and for SAPS to implement it properly pros and cons need to be explained to police officials.

ii. Those responsible for amending Police Act must adjust the structural arrangement to ensure that CIO account to the Station Commanders and District Commander to ensure proper handling and utilisation of information to fight crime. The current arrangement (that CIO accounts only to their Provincial Commander) hinders proper handling and utilisation of information to combat crime at station level. The Act must also stipulate how information must be handled and identify the person to deal with CIO at the station.

iii. CIO officials must analyse information to ensure that they produce trustworthy intelligence. That can be done by both human and system to ensure quality intelligence that can be used by OPO and yield results. If most of the intelligence produced assist and make OPO work easy, this will improve relationship between these police officials. They must work for and not against each other so that the community they are serving can also trust them. The relationship between the Station Commander and Branch Commander must improve by among other things to have regular meetings and this must form part of each’s job description.

iv. To ensure incorporation of ILP in policing, SAPS as an organisation must regulate the adoption of this approach as the one that informs the entire police operation. Lesson on how to do this must be based on other approaches such as Community Policing and Sector Policing. This must be the trend whenever the organisation is adopting any policing approach. Such will assist in uniformity of implementing an approach.

The conclusion therefore is that ILP as an approach, when implemented correctly, can be a useful tool for fighting crime in South Africa. Limitation is that the paper only focused on one region. More information can be found when more regions are involved.

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References


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