The study aimed at examining the effect of shareholder loyalty on firm value-creating outcomes in Kenya. The study used a sample of 117 institutional shareholders in listed firms in Kenya. Data was collected through questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive statistics such as mean, mode, and median and inferential statistics including factor analysis, regression, and analysis of variance (ANOVA). The study concluded that shareholder loyalty has no significant effect on firm value-creating outcomes. The study contributes to the literature on shareholder engagement, particulary on shareholder loyalty from a Kenyan angle. Shareholders are advised to consider their initial cost of investment, costs, and penalties on exit and impact on their business interests with the firm as they decide on their voice or exit actions.
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