Evolution of Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa - from Nkruma to Mutharika The 2nd: Case Study Of South Africa

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Abstract

Since Sub-Saharan Africa’s first independence in Ghana, the region has experienced massive and costly political and bureaucratic corruption within public service and administration. The causes of the corruption, its nature and form are wide and intertwined. In Sub-Saharan Africa, efforts to curb corruption have failed to discard it. The paper focused on the period from Nkruma in Ghana to Mutharika the 2nd in Malawi. This paper reviewed existing literature on political and bureaucratic corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa while on the other hand the paper employed key informant interviews to gather the required data to investigate, analyse and profile the genesis and evolution of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. The key informant interviews were employed to solicit public views and opinion from nineteen key informant participants (n=19) selected from 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper found that corruption is legendary; has entrenched itself to becoming some sort of culture in the region, and has become the most difficult socio-economic challenge to resolve in the region despite the various anti-corruption efforts employed by stakeholders to curb it. It emerged through the study that law-enforcement efforts against corruption need some reinforcement in order to be effective and efficient in uprooting corruption in the region. If Sub-Saharan Africa fails to address its corruption challenge, its development prospects would seriously curtailed.

Keywords: Bribe, Corruption, Foreign Direct Investment, Politically connected, Political elites

JEL code:
1. Introduction

The main objective of this paper is to present a chronology of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. The presentation starts from the region's first independence in Ghana when Kwame Nkrumah became the founding president up to the time of the region's last and youngest president; President Peter Mutharika of Malawi. The over-arching aim of this paper is to highlight the fact that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is historical, legendary, persistent and evolutionary and has since been perpetrated and allowed to permeate through society mainly by the region's greedy political elites and bureaucrats. This view is corroborated by Enweremadu (2012) who posited that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa – Nigeria in particular has been historical, having been incubated as far back as colonialism – and moved from one political dispensation to the other. While corruption has been widely been researched on in Sub-Saharan Africa in general, studies documenting its historicity and subsequent evolution throughout the region's various political dispensations have been largely absent if not minimal. This study wishes to fill such gap.

2. Literature review

Since the region's first independence, political elites and bureaucrats broke and destroyed every institution; from stable and productive economies and political systems except corruption. It has become extremely hard to be in sub-Saharan Africa and not witness corruption. In Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is everywhere; the palace, state house, government office, hospital, school, university, roads, street, supermarket and mortuary. You find corruption in the barracks where soldiers are used by the elites to facilitate re-elections or prolong public conflicts in order to ensure extended stay of political elites in power and gain access to public resources (Magahy et al., 2009). Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa ranges from small acts of bribery to major embezzlements of state resources worth billions of dollars which are smuggled out of the region to offshore accounts (Sadiq and Abdullahi, 2013).

In fact corruption has become lucrative business and organised entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa (Justine and Okoye, 2014). Corruption provides livelihood opportunities to those who are politically well-connected or happen to access the political power base. Massive business takes place in the Nigerian oil industry where millions of barrels of oil – especially in the Niger Delta are secretly stolen and sold abroad for massive returns that never reach the state coffers through cartels of criminal activities of politicians and business individuals (Wilson, 2014). In Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is protected by the very same political elites and bureaucrats who profess desire to fight it through laws that are passed from time to time – and yet no change in sight (Schwella, 2013). For example, Ayodeji and Odukoya (2014) found that corruption in Nigeria has infiltrated even the judiciary. These authors further revealed that lawyers have almost been reduced into middlemen responsible of brokering corrupt financial deals between clients and court judges to rule in the client's favour – especially accused criminals. The passing of laws is one process despised by many Africa's political elites and bureaucrats because they have actually turned the region into a farce where lawlessness is more prominent than lawfulness. For example, the anti-corruption rhetoric in Sub-Saharan Africa is heard all over the world and by the ordinary voter – especially during election times being used by politicians to lure voters to return them to political power and lobbying for legitimacy and support from the international community – especially those who supply much needed development aid to the respective regimes. Despite the anti-corruption rhetoric, anti-corruption laws and regulations are violated openly by political elite.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, autocracies, authoritarianisms, dictatorships, militarisms, personal dynasties and monarchism inter-changeably dominated political economy for decades since first independence. Although this situation persisted for much longer periods at some point – especially in western Africa where militarism dominated political economy, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) did concede that there came a period of some positive changes when most part of the region began to move towards democratisation. Countless literature opined that the scramble for political power in Sub-Saharan Africa has been largely motivated by wanton desire of political elites to exploit public resources. Those who study Sub-Saharan Africa would confirm that the region's political and public service bureaucratic systems only change to make corruption much easier and affordable; not less and neither do they
change for promotion of good governance. Political leadership in Sub-Saharan Africa changes to facilitate for those who were far away from public resources to access public resources. Political changes in Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly not for advancing democracy, accountability, development and growth, but promotion of opportunities for corruption for the politically connected in particular.

Many agree that Sub-Saharan Africa, despite its abundant natural productive resources of its world acclaimed environment and some charismatic political leaders of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and South Africa's first black post-apartheid president Nelson Mandela' class became the world's poorest region mainly through its corrupt political leadership who traded statesmanship for greed and corruption (Akindele, 2005). Greedy political elites have total disregard of the collective, people centredness and connectedness as such political elites promote self-interests at the expense of the public they are supposed to serve (Merriam and Ntseane, 2008). In collaboration with this assertion, Mbeki (2011) conceded that Sub-Saharan Africa's economic development and growth has mainly stagnated as a result of the region's lack of committed and innovative political leadership.

While colonialism, imperialism and apartheid characterised race-based political systems which sought to promote white domination and supremacy over indigenous Africans in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mafukata, 2012; Mashele and Qobo, 2014), political godfatherism characterised political economy in modern Sub-Saharan Africa (Justine and Okoye, 2014) in what Jean-Francois Bayart called “politics of the belly” system (Young, 1999). Godfatherism in the political economy of Sub-Saharan Africa emanates from clear failure and absence of thoughtful political leadership and bureaucracy because, political leadership and bureaucrats in the region are primarily pre-occupied by breeding and growing corruption through promotion of self-interests over public interests (Justine and Okoye, 2014). Political elites in Sub-Saharan Africa have institutionalised corruption (Adebayo, 2013). If there has ever been anything of prominence in modern Sub-Saharan Africa, it has to be corruption; and not development, human advancement, good governance and efficient public service delivery. The region has become allergic and paralysed to good governance in a political system already deeply contaminated with poisonous corruption (Adebayo, 2013).

Although it is generally difficult to quantify corruption in terms of public revenue lost to it, it has however been widely reported that corruption costs Sub-Saharan Africa approximately $150 billion per annum. In the 2011-2012 financial year, approximately R1 billion was lost to corruption in South Africa only (Tamukamoyo, 2013). In Nigeria alone, it is said that corruption by political elites – especially military dictators such as General Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha who looted the country's oil and petroleum revenue had cost the country more than $300 billion since independence (Uneke, 2010). In fact, General Ibrahim Babangida is thought to have single-handedly embezzled approximately $2.5 billion of Nigeria's public funds during his term of office (Adebayo, 2013). Justine and Okoye (2014) in fact portrayed corruption in Nigeria as having been so deeply entrenched into every system of government to a point “it would appear that the nature of the Nigerian society makes corruption a persistent and lucrative business”. Based on this, Adebayo (2013) argued that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has been completely institutionalised and accepted as both normal and cultural.

The loot from corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly hidden in European and offshore banks (Uneke, 2010) in places such as Switzerland while other loot is used in the purchase of expensive fixed properties in places such as London, Paris, New York and Dubai (Sadiq and Abdullahi, 2013). It is easier to recognise the fact that corruption has become Sub-Saharan Africa's socio-economic challenge in chief which continues persistently haunting post-liberation governments in the region (Sithole, 2013; Tamukamoyo, 2013).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, anti-corruption regulatory laws are passed, law enforcement agencies intervene by arresting and prosecuting offenders, civil society protests and campaigns against corrupt individuals and governments – at times to an extent of employing violent public disorders and the international communities pressurise governments to remove corruption but the achievements remain widely insignificant to removing corruption in the region. Mbaku (1996) corroborated this assertion. However, this paper concedes that the region
has had since independence some countries on the one hand with good anti-corruption records. For example, Botswana has been one of the least corrupt countries worldwide and in Sub-Saharan Africa, and for several decades.

For decades Economic, Development, Political and Public Service and Administration disciplines have engaged in the investigation of political corruption worldwide – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where corruption has been rampant for almost six decades since the region's first independence in 1960 in Ghana to date. However, this paper does not opine that corruption is an African factor only neither does the paper imply that corruption was first discovered in the region. In fact, some (Camerer, 2009; van Rensburg, 2007) argue that corruption is alien to Sub-Saharan Africa as it could be traced as far back as the region's imperialism and colonisation by some European countries which disrupted and corroded African public service values and norms which were mostly executed by traditional dynasties.

Although Von Benda-Beckmann (1981) didn't categorically confirm that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a product of some European influence during imperialism and colonisation of the region just as Camerer and van Rensburg seem to suggest, Von Benda-Beckmann instead seems to make a critical inference that colonisation and imperialism were meant nevertheless to impose European systems of public administration and governance on African political and governance systems. Indeed it becomes clear from the literature mentioned earlier that imported Eurocentric values and norms imposed on African political and governance systems had at some point drifted away from the region's existing traditional values creating fertile environment for corruption to develop and grow to a massive problem it has become today. On this, Camerer (2009), Uneke (2010) and van Rensburg (2007) assert that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa would in some cases be ascribed to imported norms and values of (European) modernisation and socio-economic development that took place in the region over the colonial and imperial period – especially with the introduction of westernised bureaucratic political systems in the beginning of the 16th century. A plethora of literature (Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Mafukata, 2012; Mbeki, 2011) corroborate that Sub-Saharan Africa – especially in nation states such as Great Zimbabwe, Ghana and Mali for example were a politically stable and economically thriving region with trade connections as far afield as China operating through African indigenous prescriptions and laws – with no evidence of modern day corruption. The region had vibrant indigenous political systems and public administration and service dispensing public governance prior to European imperialism and colonisation. This paper therefore argues based on the assertion that whoever portrays Sub-Saharan Africa's pre-colonial and imperialism political economy as naïve, backward and primitive undermines what existed as bonafide systems of a sovereign polity in Sub-Saharan Africa's nation states during that time.

In support of the view that corruption might be alien to Sub-Saharan Africa, Dintwe (2012) also argued that corruption in South Africa as currently experienced by the post-apartheid government for example might have been “inherited from the past” The past in this case referring to apartheid South Africa of the National Party government which came into power in 1948, and ruled South Africa up to 27 April 1994 when South Africa became a multi-party democracy led by the African National Congress (ANC) government of Nelson Mandela. Contrary to the notion that corruption might have been imported from the imperialism and colonial dispensations in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is the argument that corruption has been there in the region long before imperialism and colonisation. This view posits that, instead, what might have become different is the modernisation of corruption. Supposing that corruption were to be an issue of imperialism and colonisation of the region, we obviously wouldn't have had indigenous African sayings such as “Tshanda-nguwhoni” and “mugwinyathi” as used by the Vhavenda of Northern Limpopo Province for example. “Tshanda-nguwhoni” and “mugwinyathi” refer to bribes paid by commoners to the elites – especially traditional leaders. Borrowing from this language might be critical for corruption commentators to premise that corruption might instead have been in existence in Sub-Saharan Africa long before colonisation and imperialism in the region. These language references are legendary amongst the Vhavenda, dating back as far as the 14th century when this ethnic group from somewhere East Africa first settled at an area called Mapungubwe; north of South Africa (Nemudzivhadi, 1978). Clearly, corruption and bribe might have existed in different nation states in Sub-Saharan Africa several centuries before imperialism and colonisation first appeared here.
On the one hand, developmentalists such as Camerer, Uneke and van Rensburg generally believe that corruption becomes inevitable during modernisation and economic development. This suggests that for as long as Sub-Saharan Africa was developing and modernising, corruption in one way or another was inevitable in the region. Regardless of the supposed origin of corruption, and its subsequent entrenchment into the political economy of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, what emerges most clearly is that corruption is real in the region and it comes with devastating consequences including massive poverty incidences, inequality and underdevelopment (Harris and van der Merwe, 2011; Sithole 2013) – and a workable solution has to be found. In seeking for this solution, scholars of various fields and disciplines have made corruption become a global research and debate issue (Adebayo, 2013; Tiscornia, 2011). Without delving much on the origin of corruption, this paper however merely acknowledges its high intensity and volatility in the Sub-Saharan Africa region as compared to the rest of the world. Secondly, this paper does not seek to measure the extent of corruption in the regions for comparisons. Consensus already exists through prior studies that Sub-Saharan Africa has become an exceptional and chronic case of corruption compared to the rest of the world (Uneke, 2010). This paper assumes this theoretical assumption.

Of the ten most corrupt countries in the world, six are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Dziva (2014) argued that Sub-Saharan Africa has had a fair share of increased lawlessness, looting of public resources, lack of transparency and accountability by despotic political elites and bureaucrats in public service and administration who collaboratively embezzle public resources at will.

Corruption reduced Foreign Direct Investment prospects (Asiedu, 2006) thereby negatively impacting on government revenue while raising up transaction costs (Camerer, 2011). In a way these factors lead to poor financial capabilities of the region to develop itself. For example, Camerer (2011) and Dziva (2014) reported that corruption has culminated into distortions of development imperatives and priorities leading to chronic infrastructure underdevelopment, lack of jobs and escalation of incidences of poverty amongst the ordinary populace in the region which manifested in exacerbated inequalities in society. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most unequal society in the world with countries such as South Africa suffering racial and gender inequalities more than any other despite what seems to be a thriving constitutional democracy (Mafukata, 2012). Corruption is proof of Africa’s socio-economic stagnation and decline (Alence, 2004). Consensus is that corruption arrests regional development (Alo, 2014).

While in the process, various corruption combating instruments and measures have emerged – in South Africa for example (Baqwa, 2001; Jackson et al., 2009; Cakata, 2011) and Zimbabwe (Sithole, 2013), what is evident is that the effectiveness and success of such measures have been largely insignificant to removing – or at least to minimising corruption (Holzcausen, 2007; Mbaku, 1996). Some commentators on corruption have even conceded that corruption has emerged as invincible, indispensable and inherently difficult to resolve in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Conceding to this assertion, Adebayo (2013) and Camerer (2009) respectively hinted therefore thus corruption is “unavoidable outcome of modernisation and development” and “difficult to treat” in Sub-Saharan Africa. Evidently, it is clear that corruption has almost become a culture of Sub-Saharan Africa with “people having come to accept it is a common practice” and “normal” in countries such as Zimbabwe and Nigeria for example (Sithole, 2013; Adebayo, 2013). Corruption has entrenched itself as an integral part of society, and of the “value systems” of the Sub-Saharan Africa polity (Uneke, 2010; Adebayo, 2013).

However, borrowing from Friedman (2007) where he argued that “culture is nested in contexts, not genes…not wired into our human DNA”, this paper argues that the notion that posits the invincibility of corruption might not be convincing because if corruption stems from a context of historical experience such as the region’s colonial and imperial subjugations, leadership deficiencies, corrosion of human values and ethics, then like culture which changes when such factors change, corruption could also change with the factors changing. Sithole (2013) corroborates this assertion. With intense lobbying for democratisation and promotion of good governance by various lobby groups such as the NEPAD and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) launched in July 2001 (van Rensburg, 2007) for example taking place in the intense pace witnessed today, corruption should be a culture undergoing significant change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed we concede that any projections advocating for total eradication of corruption might in all probability be highly ambitious given corruption’s clear integration and
embeddedness in society around the world. But, on the one hand, to also deny possibilities of the reduction of corruption might equally being unthoughtful. Botswana must offer a great deal of courage to other countries considering the her ability to contain corruption. What is it which Botswana does to curb corruption which the other countries could emulate, for example?

On the one hand, away from the invincibility of corruption theory espoused by Camerer (2009) for example, Habtenmichael and Cloete (2010) argued that corruption has shown signs of being evolutionary with new forms and mechanisms to adapt to subsequent environments created by anti-corruption measures and related instruments. In other words, corruption thrives the same way as a virus would do – for as long as the environmental conditions were conducive, the virus lives. Justine and Okoye (2014) likened corruption to a virus. Corruption survives on the victim based on favourable conditions (Akindele, 2005) just as a virus would survive if the conditions were favourable. Like a virus which does not always have to kill its host victim, corruption would also not necessarily have to kill Sub-Saharan Africa but to exist in the region causing some paralysis in as far as weakening of accountability of government, undermining political institutions, erosion of economic growth and reduction of resources for infrastructural development while discouraging Foreign Direct Investment in the region amongst others for example. Hacioglu et al. (2012) explains in depth the role of FDIs – especially in politically less stable regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption is a socio-political factor – depending on the angle from which it is observed. Therefore, the existence of political factors such as corruption might weaken a state in what Jackson and Rosberg (1982) conceded might be factors of “administrative decay” which might be accompanied by the weakening of the state. However, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) did confirm that despite weaknesses, no state has ever been destroyed. Camerer (2011) and Dintwe (2012) explained and elaborated more intensively and extensively the factors giving prominence to corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Therefore, even before we could opine whether corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has been part of the political, public service and administration regimes the signs are already there that indeed corruption in this region might have been historical and subsequently embedded as an integral part of the political economy of the region for decades up to the current political systems, political economy; public governance; administration and service systems. Quick to point however is that this paper is not meant to convey “another dissident insinuation” (Outa, 2001) to African leadership and neither does the paper try to portray Sub-Saharan Africa in a bad light – and above all inability of Africans to lead themselves. The focus is exploration of issues as they unfolded in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence, and hopefully to tell truth to power/policy makers – if indeed anybody cares to listen in this beautiful part of the world.

3. Methodology and data
3.1 Study design

This paper is qualitative. The paper bears descriptive and inductive properties allowing for uncovering of meaning and attitudes from the perspective of the participants of the study (Gukurume, 2011; Merriam and Ntseane, 2008). In addition, some data were collected from various literature sources including journals, organisational reports on corruption and government sources.

The researcher also conducted some interviews to hear the views of different informed members of the public on corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. The researcher tried to distribute the selection of the participants as wide across the region as possible for balance. For this purpose, data were also gathered from 19 key informant participants (n=19) selected through snowballing techniques. The respondents were selected from amongst foreign nationals living in, or visiting South Africa for various reasons. In some cases however, participants were lobbied for participation when the researcher met some of these informants when visiting other countries in the region. For example, participants in Namibia, Uganda and Zambia were interviewed during such visits. However, it was not easy to persuade some of the participants to take part in the study because some of them expressed fears for reprisals – especially those from DR Congo, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. All the participants requested for non-disclosure of identity despite the fact that the information requested was in most cases public knowledge already. Participants
were sourced from Botswana (2), DR Congo (2), Ghana (1), Malawi (1), Namibia (1), Nigeria (1), Rwanda (2), South Africa (4), Uganda (1), Zambia (4) and Zimbabwe (1). Collected data were recorded as field notes for analyses. Data were analysed through constant comparative method of data analysis (Merriam and Ntseane, 2008). The results were incorporated into the discussions of the main report.

3.2 Research Approach

3.2.1 Some academic reflections on “the ecosystem of corruption”

In order to arrive at the objective of this paper, we based our study design from what this paper refers to as “the ecosystem of corruption”. The ecosystem of corruption deals with what corruption entailed, its composition, and who its stakeholders were. In a corruption ecosystem, we look beyond the participants. We look into what is also taking place; how activities unfold in the process. First we explain why it is so crucial to revisit the ecosystem of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding of the ecosystem of corruption would enhance the ability to evaluate corruption in terms of its conceptualisation, causes, consequences, theoretical and methodological approaches involving anti-corruption measures; design and implementation (Camerer, 2009). In other words, we premise that corruption is not only a public service and administration concept or factor but a multi-disciplinary factor, and therefore not only to be addressed through public service and administration measures. We argue that corruption would therefore need an intertwined multi-disciplinary approach to address (Dintwe, 2012). This view is corroborated by Mwenda (2011) who argued that corruption could also be addressed from amongst others Public International Law perspective in case of diplomatic corruption for example.

The approach employed for this paper would challenge the stereotypes which have been in existence in the public service and administration disciplines which have had over the years an over- emphasised and flawed assumption that they only could all by themselves resolve the many questions and issues of the corruption debate. Public service and administration disciplines have lacked alternatively the crucial acknowledgement of other disciplines on the question of corruption, or never sufficiently recognised other disciplines in the corruption debate. Furthermore, understanding the ecosystem of corruption approach would vividly allow for a holistic assessment of corruption. In other words, this paper emphasises and advocates for a holistic approach to studying corruption having considered limitations of studies which try to do the same from single-approach theories. This approach is in agreement with the assertions expressed by Dintwe (2012) who argued that the study of corruption has to be multi-inter-trans-disciplinary in nature.

3.2.2 Participants in corruption and the roles they play

First, in corruption, there has to be the corruptee and the corrupter operating from a complex system of participants and events. Both the participants; the corruptee and the corrupter bring to the activity something needed by the other. For instance, the corruptee is in charge of public resources or service needed by the corrupter. The corrupter needs the public resources or service, and has the cash in the form of bribes or kickbacks needed by the corruptee. The corrupter offers the cash in kickbacks or bribes while the corruptee offers access to public resources by flaunting and infringing public service and administration policy and regulatory frameworks using entrusted power by the state for example. Both the corruptee and the corrupter therefore purposefully engage in self-seeking activities motivated by greed to personally gain from public resources or service. It is clear that for the activities to succeed, certain rules and regulations have to be seriously undermined. Usually these transactions involve huge amounts of resources, and that is why they often involve a chain of participants who clandestinely collaborate in criminal activities ranging from fraudulent and non-existent services, to siphoning off the resources from public service and accounts to fictitious bank accounts, until such resources are safe in the hands of the participants in chief for instance. In short, corruption is not only unethical in terms of proper governance frameworks but cleverly interwoven criminal activities which might leave no trail for trace as well. The stakes are high in corruption. This is evidenced by the number of casualties and victims from such activities should anything threatening the participants become inevitable.

For the purpose of this study, the main actors are the political elites who collude with bureaucrats within public service and other interested parties who might be operating from outside public service and administration to benefit
from state resources. From this point, we can not tell where the corrupter or the corruptee are located in the system, but only what happens during the transaction would determine where each participant is. In other words, the corrupter or the corruptee might be anyone of the participants, and vice versa. The main objective of the participants is self-aggrandizement (Uneke, 2010). Based on this, Uneke (2010) posited that corruption might involve subordinates and superiors; governments and agencies who might be influenced by internal or/and external factors (Dintwe, 2012) – including trans-border transactions in some cases (Sithole, 2013).

3.2.3 Issues of governance systems and corruption

One more thing to understand is that corruption affects all forms and systems of governments; democratic, Aristocratic, monarchic and despotic (Chipkin, 2012). In other words, corruption is not only a factor of despotic and dictatorial systems as some commentators would love the public to believe. No single system of government can claim to have absence of corruption. However, we conceded that intensity of corruption would differ with every system of government. For example, corruption would reasonably be intense outside democratic systems of government where transparency and accountability are expected to be intense than in dictatorship, autocracies, authoritarianisms and absolute monarchist systems such as Swaziland for example. In other words, this paper contests the assumptions made by some commentators of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa which seek to reflect corruption as an issue resulting solely from the region's dictatorial, authoritarian, autocratic and monarchist regime systems. Our counter-argumentation is based on evidence of corruption elsewhere in the world where governance systems have been considerably democratised for example. Most crucially is the fact that regime type and systems would not suggest absence of corruption, maybe minimisation of it. Corruption can be in every nation, people and society (Sithole, 2013) because corruption is a human practice of choice which is never compelling, which could affect any sort of political systems and region.

3.2.4 Corruption is an act of choice by the perpetrators

Corruption is human behaviour motivated by greed and uncontrolled desire to amass wealth and resources through the misuse of entrusted power and abuse of public office (Uneke, 2010). The justification of this assertion might be located in the submissions of Mohandas K. Ghandhi whose writings in the so-called “The Roots of Violence” as recorded by van Rensburg (2009) hinted thus: “Wealth without work,...Pleasure without conscience,...Knowledge without character,...Commerce without morality, and ... Politics without principles” all contribute to the demise of man's character – especially political elites and bureaucrats involved in clandestine conspiracies to plunder what has to be for public advancement and well-being. In addition, man's desire to be capitalistic, and not communalistic elevates individual needs above those of the community (van Rensburg, 2007), encouraging resource plundering thereof. To corroborate our view in this regard is Schwella (2003) who argued that it was the greed and desire for opulence which drove the former Police Commissioner of South Africa and President of Interpol Mr Jackie Selebi into associating with known criminals of Glen Agliotti’s stature to a point of accepting bribes in violation of the trust bestowed on him by the South African nation, in addition, also placing his lucrative career on the line. Schwella (2003) further argued that Jackie Selebi's high salary could have satisfactorily provided for him what made him wanted to have through corruption.

Clearly, Selebi had much more complications that drove him into corruption than mere omissions of some regulations and ethics. On this, Lawrence E. Harrison – the retired USAID Diplomat and Professor at Tufts argued in his work “The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics can change a culture and save it from itself” elaborated on by Friedman (2007) that social ills such as corruption – to be sufficiently addressed, might even require consideration of man's association with religiosity or spirituality. Both van Rensburg and Harrison's viewpoints opine that corruption goes far deeper and wider than mere omissions and transgressions of legislative frameworks – including constitutions for it appears to cut across into man's morals. More precisely, and based on the deductions made above, I argue that corruption is therefore motivated by personal or group wanton desire to unfairly and criminally gain from a situation where the participants opine that they have an opportunity to exploit the gap(s) of the resource
or service procuring system. In other words, the public representative agrees to sell public service or resources for personal benefit to satisfy that deep-seated personal desire.

The Commissioner of Police – who off course in all probability is expected to know the consequences of engaging in corrupt activities agrees to sell security and freedom to a criminal fugitive in exchange of bribes – no matter how minute the bribe or kickback might have been. The Commissioner of Police had in his exposure all the legislative and regulatory frameworks of the responsibilities and duties expected of his office yet transgressed all those. In view of this, I profess that both van Rensburg and Harrison's viewpoints hold water supported by the insinuations made by Dintwe (2012) who posited that “corruption cannot disappear mainly through the reaction by law enforcement”

3.2.5 Opinions on public service corruption

Some commentators of corruption argue that in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is a product of imperialism, colonisation and apartheid systems, and not necessarily an African issue. However, a plethora of literature attest to the fact that corruption has been massively entrenched into African Public Service and Administration domains ever since the region's first independence in Ghana of Kwame Nkruma, and since then it has been through one generation of political elite to the other. Evidence suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa has been having that upsurge of corruption despite so many of the countries in the region having had democratised their political systems in the early 1990s. Rock and Bonnett (2004) went to an extent of positing that corruption in the region has “been rising to infinity” Are these commentators extremists or alarmists who refuse to be positive on African affairs? No. Instead, their view is shared by several and many other students of African political economy.

When we were conducting field work in some places in South Africa for example, we discovered that, and most shockingly, that there were some grass-roots people who had begun to even compare current political elites with apartheid era elites in terms of corruption hardly 20 years after South Africa's democratisation process which had been widely and internationally acclaimed as one of the best political transitions to democracy in the world. In South Africa, ordinary people in the streets argue that even Bantustan (self-governing tribal homelands for black South Africans) leaders who served the apartheid regime to oppress the black majority in the country never amassed the volume of wealth, or lived in arrogant opulence witnessed amongst modern political elites and bureaucrats in what was supposed to be a democratic dispensation with focus on the lives of the poor. From time to time dissident voices of the ordinary citizenry who compare current post-apartheid leaders to the likes of Lucas Mangope, Patrick Mphephu, Cedric Phathudi, Hudson Ntsanwisi, George Matanzima, Charles Mopedi and Mangosuthu Buthelezi are heard in street corners and beer halls. These voices of dissent are however drowned away by the beneficiaries – political elites and bureaucrats of the current dispensation who issue desperate castigations of the lamenting voices and critiques as being “anti-revolutionaries” or “counter-revolutionaries”; whatever suits the rhetoric. Amongst the apartheid collaborators’ Bantustan regimes, it was never heard of any of them or their relatives spending R248 million on alleged “security upgrades” on personal property of a head of a government as was the case in the Nkandla scandal.

Most critically is the fact that the current intensity of corruption in the South African public life and government systems invites the ordinary people to have a critical analyses, assessment and evaluation of their government and politicians – it doesn't have to depend on the acceptability of such evaluations by the political elite and their bureaucrats. Grass-roots masses would always form opinion on their governments, politicians and bureaucrats based on perceived performance, and such opinions guide these masses in decision-making processes on governments and politicians – especially when such decisions become crucial during elections, referendums and even when challenging the legitimacy of government for example. In every political systems there is a time when the electorate – especially the excluded and marginalised looks at political economic issues and public administration and service in their own perspective; make evaluations if such systems benefited them or certain beneficiaries – through political connections, parentage, family ties, kinsmanship, ethnicity, and so forth. This might explain the reason why the majority of the key informant participants (89.5%) for this paper expressed access to government resources being mainly facilitated by ethnic dominance and influence. In their view, the closer one got into the inner circle of the
dominant ethnic group in party politics and government – especially around the presidents of countries and ruling political parties one would have highly increased their opportunities to also get a share of the public resources cake. Many a scrupulous characters begin to build their opportunities towards state resources by developing their influence within party politics. The assertion is that the easiest rout to the public stake is through party politics. Furthermore, those who are already around the benefits also fight to keep the advancing others as far away as possible or at least to protect the entitlement – especially when the political incumbent is also threatened; say for example, by anticipated political leadership change. Ethnicity becomes a lobbying ticket to hold onto power for political elites, and to access the benefits on state resources for the now ethnicised political fiasco. What starts as mere greed for public resources access and entitlement might end as an ugly warfare for access to, consolidation of political supremacy and the subsequent entitlement of public resources. As revealed in Bratton et al. (2005), it becomes the battle of ethnic groups; the majority Ovambo of Sam Nujoma in Namibia against the others; majority Chewa against the Tumbuka in Malawi; the Akan and Ashanti against the Ewes of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana; the Bambaras of Mali against Sonhai, Maures, etc and the majority Shona of Robert Mugabe and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe for example.

Despite political rhetoric by politicians – especially those in ruling party politics, public proclamations such as “we are the rainbow nation” in South Africa for example, the feeling amongst some ordinary South Africans is that fortune favours the AmaXhosa and the Ama-Zulu in national political economy while in multi-ethnic provinces such as Limpopo, the majority thought fortune favoured the majority Northern Sotho groups. From ethnicised political economy, that is where comes references such as “Xhosanostra” and “100% Zulu boy” in South Africa for example. The so-called “Xhosanostra” reference was dominant during President Mbeki’s term as president of the ANC and country when some who felt excluded and marginalised in Mbeki’s administration started to play ethnic references insinuating that President Mbeki’s appointments of personnel into government’s senior positions had in main favoured the Xhosa speaking people; Mbeki’s ethnic group. A sizeable number of people believed Mbeki’s Xhosas dominated his cabinet, government parastatals and even Directors General of government departments. On the one hand, the so-called “100% Zulu boy” rhetoric was made a popular slogan by a lobby group for Jacob Zuma; himself a Zulu against Thabo Mbeki during the African National Congress (ANC) 53rd elective conference in Limpopo in December 2007 when Jacob Zuma eventually defeated President Mbeki as leader of the ANC – and later recalled him as president of the country before the end of his term of office. Even at this era, there are still some who believe President Zuma became the ANC president on the dominance and strength of his Zulu ethnic group within the structures of the ANC. Zuma's KwaZulu-Natal province has the highest number of voting delegates to the ANC voting conferences, and with numbers so critical a factor during election of leadership in the ANC, Zuma was expected to have had a standing advantage.

Whether this theory is correct or not, the point is that politics of ethnicity based on access of public resources still rule the larger part of public life and political thinking in the political economic debate of the Sub-Saharan Africa region in general and South Africa in particular. Clearly, like corruption, ethnic politics reflected mixed effects in political economy as Bratton et al. (2005) correctly pointed out that what was supposed to have been issues of simple economic attitudes get into nasty ethno-economic considerations and mudslingings. Often this takes what Bond and Manyanya (2002) referred to as having “lamentable ethnic overtones” referring to competitions in the political economy of Zimbabwe's majority Shona and the minority Ndebele. Even accomplished movements such as the ANC in South Africa and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe for example reflected from time to time some patterns of weird ethnic orientations despite political elites’ insistence of unities – all because members of political formations would want a way into political power base and eventually public resources. The way things are in South Africa, the country might as well have to go a step beyond divisive politics of race; between minority whites and majority Blacks – which characterised the pre-liberation era in South Africa to a dispensation of resolving what I call “politics of ethnicity” which has become something the excluded and marginalised felt was used against them with regard access to the public cake. The 2013 Malamulele protests and violence in the Thulamela municipality of Limpopo Province, South Africa is one case in point. Ethnic references were used by the Tsongas who felt excluded
and marginalised by the Venda on municipal service and in particular job opportunities access in the municipality. Ethnicity could breed political disorder (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).

When the ordinary citizens realise their omission from political power and public resource cake, revolts, public disorders and violence, protests and instabilities become inevitable. As Jackson and Rosberg (1982) observed, uncontrolled ethnic orientations could easily breed and disintegrate any political system into political disorders, Sub-Saharan Africa, with her proneness to such tendencies might be terribly exposed to consequential instabilities stemming from such tendencies. Like ethnicity, corruption will always have some mixed effects both on the electorate and polity. When there are far too many corruption scandals as Bond and Manyanya (2002) alluded to, the public begins to question the legitimacy of political regimes. Unfortunately, the tendency within post-independence regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular is that they pretend to know everything that the citizenry needed or wanted (Bratton et al., 2005) forgetting that the poor never protest against getting rich for they too cherish the day of their riches. The poor only protest against getting rich through corruption, and mechanisms of exclusions and marginalisation by those that they “helped” bring into power begin to amass wealth with the selected few and the politically connected (Sebola, 2014) at the expense of the poor majority's hardships (Bond and Manyanya, 2002).

It therefore remains common to find citizens holding views or even complaining of having to access public service only through some political connections – especially with ruling parties (Sebola, 2014). In South Africa for example, some within the ordinary public feel it is nearly impossible in South Africa to be a ruling party politician and never amass wealth. The wealthy are even called “AmaBEE” or “Tenderpreneurs” after government programmes of black empowerment and procurement systems which the ordinary citizens opined to mostly favour those within the inner circle of ruling party politics. In fact, the exploitation of the BEE programme in South Africa by the ruling party influential politicians has developed amongst the ordinary citizens a perception that the programme is by and large of the ruling party's programme more than it being a government programme. From this point, it becomes clear that an often time there is confusion even amongst politicians of not knowing the difference between government responsibilities and party politics. Sebola (2014) critically and comprehensively alluded to models and theories on public service and administration and the expected relationship of these with government.

3.2.6 Who owns corruption?

This question is critical considering accusations and counter-accusations in modern sciences. Some claim corruption has been imported from Europe during colonisation and imperialism of Africa while others believe it is an issue of the so-called Third World nations. In short, no one owns corruption.

We however point out that tendencies from Eurocentrism and Westernisation of good governance in global political economy make insinuations which reflect the so-called Third World regions – especially Africa as the owners of corruption. To some extent one can notice sheer ignorance, alternatively distortion of facts and pure racial tendencies of propagation of supremacy of race over another race (Mafukata, 2012). Such tendencies are not unusual in political economy. While corruption is a global phenomenon affecting nearly every region in the world (Campos and Dimova, 2010; Dintwe, 2012; Tiscornia, 2011) including modern day economically progressive countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan for example (Sindzingre and Milleli, 2010) in one form or another (Quina, 2008), few of those who study African political economy would deny that on the one hand corruption has indeed become the nemesis of the region's 60 years of political independence (Mbeki, 2011).

Corruption affects all forms and systems of governments; democratic, Aristocratic, monarchic and despotic regimes (Chipkin, 2012). In other words, it is not only a factor of despotic and dictatorial systems as some commentators would love the public to believe. The so-called Watergate scandal of President Richard Nixon in the United States is evidence of corruption being factor where conditions are favourable – not necessarily for those regions of the developing world referred to as the Third World. Simply put, anybody is capable of being corrupted; whether the country runs interventionist political governance and administration system or a liberal market-orientated system, it doesn't matter (Rock and Bonnet, 2004). Corruption is traced in the so-called Sarafina Two (Jackson et al., 2009), Travel gate scandal and the much publicised Nkandla gate in South Africa. In fact, Tamukamoyo (2013) reported
that during the 2011-2012 financial year, 758 individuals were investigated for acts of corruption in South Africa. Corruption has resulted in the sanctioning of powerful political elite of Zimbabwe including the president by the majority of the western countries. The so-called cash gate scandal cost President Joyce Banda re-election in Malawi in 2014. Widespread corruption has almost become a pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa alongside HIV and AIDS – a status which makes the region a cult of socio-economic ills worldwide. In fact Persson et al. (2010) and Uneke (2010) conceded that corruption has elevated Sub-Saharan Africa into a leading indisputable global brand characterised by exceptional rates of corrupt practices.

3.3 Theoretical standpoint on corruption for this paper

Clearly, this paper contrasts the so-called “greasing the wheel” or “lubricant” (Uneke, 2010) assertion espoused in classical business and political economy literature of amongst others Less (1964), Leys (1965), Huntington (1968), Beck and Mahler (1986), Lien (1986) and of late Vial and Hanoteau (2010) and Dreher & Gassebener (2013) who all posited that corruption could be an escape route to enhancing political and bureaucratic efficiency where firms and public service and administration have become rigid and obsolete. These authors argued that corruption makes the rigid, over-centralised and dishonest bureaucracy's official function easier. For example, Less (1964) and Huntington (1968) argued that winning of contracts for service or getting a licence to operate a service through corruption might get to benefit public service and administration as these acts might enhance efficiency of the bureaucracy; amongst others speeding up the processes involved there-by enhancing service delivery and speeding up service amongst others (Dreher and Gassebener, 2011).

However, this paper is of the view espoused by Meon and Sekkut (2005) who refuted the so-called “greasing the wheel” apothegm instead subscribing to the views espoused by a plethora of various other writers (Mendoza et al., 2013; Demas, 2011; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002) amongst others who posit that corruption is by and large impeding to development and growth as its negative impact seriously derailed the ability of the country to attract investments and in addition furthermore increasing income inequalities in society amongst others. According to Borraine (2014) and Mashele and Qobo (2014), it is massive corruption within the ruling party (ANC) in South Africa which has almost sent the country into a journey of a failing state. Tamukamoyo (2013) critically analyses issues of corruption within the African National Congress (ANC) government in South Africa – when investigating its commitment and achievements on corruption since the ANC became government in South Africa in 1994.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1 Diary of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Nkrumah to Mutharika the 2nd

This section diarises the chronology of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa starting from Africa's first post-liberation president Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana up to the region's latest and youngest president Peter Mutharika of Malawi. In this paper President Peter Mutharika is referred to as Mutharika 11 because he is the second Mutharika after the late Bingu Mutharika – coincidentally brothers to become Malawi’s presidents.

Sub-Saharan Africa has had a number of challenges since the first independence. To start with, post-independence political elites in Sub-Saharan Africa sought to consolidate political power by dispensing resources to political supporters to ensure retention of political power (Batton et al., 2005). From this, emerged what came to haunt the region's socio-economic progress for decades; corruption. The region has since never recovered from corruption. Instead corruption is fast rising to infinity (Rock and Bonnett, 2004) almost becoming contagious affecting every generation of political leaders and public service and administration bureaucrats in the region (Adebayo, 2013; Akindele, 2005; Gbenga, 2008). Adebayo (2013) summarised the contagious nature of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa perfectly when saying “the young ones are born into it, grow up in it, live with it, and possibly will die with it...the aged are not left out as they are re-socialised and begin to confront it” Deerfield (2013) on the one hand argued that corruption therefore mutates through family connections and party politics for generations. Corruption is a vicious cycle in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper profiles the genesis of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa through the various political dispensations. The dispensations were categorised as follows:
4.1.1 Sub-Saharan Africa, liberation fathers and corruption

Immediately after independence, politics in Sub-Saharan Africa took another turn; from imperialistic and colonial governance to autocracies and authoritarianisms led by the so-called Africa's founding fathers. These regimes had total disregard for democracy (Khunou, 2011). The so-called post-liberation fathers became dictators and oppressors of Africa's poor. Governments were highly characterised by widespread corruptions and personal enrichment. The tide turned however in the early 90s when most of these post-liberation regimes and founding fathers were removed from political power mainly through the ballot in elections that brought fundamental change in the politics of the region. For example, President Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) lost an election after the electorate cast a protest vote against Banda's massive corruption and authoritarianism. The post-Banda regimes in Malawi were also riddled with allegations of massive corruption. For example, in most recent times, President Joyce Banda was embroiled in a massive corruption scandal duped “Cash gate” few months before she lost an election to President Peter Mutharika. In this case, approximately $100 million in foreign aid is alleged to have been fraudulently embezzled by politicians aligned to the president in hard cash which was siphoned off to offshore accounts. Pointers are that Malawians knew how to remove a perceived corrupt government and political incumbent from power.

In 1991, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia lost an election after ruling Zambia since 24 October 1964 after a revolt by the electorate against corruption and authoritarianism. In Zambia, subsequent regimes from President Frederick Chiluba to Rupia Banda were also known for massive corruption. The late President Frederick Chiluba was accused of massive corruption and was even prosecuted in a dramatic trial which some argued amounted to victimisation and persecution by the late President Levy Mwanawasa. In Zambia, the wife of the former President of Zambia, Rupia Banda is currently also being investigated for corruption – especially with regard her unexplained wealth accumulated in real estate investments.

President Daniel Arap Moi conceded power to President Mwai Kibaki in Kenya on allegations of massive corruption and authoritarianism spanning over two decades. Mwai Kibaki was also accused of corruption by the opposition led by Uhuru Kenyatta the son of the founding father of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta who defeated Kibaki in a dramatic and violent election which saw many politically motivated killings.

In Zimbabwe, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe is widely known as the founding father of Zimbabwe. However, it did not take long before Mugabe could be accused of massive corruption in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's so-called Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme is said to have been a way of enriching President Robert Mugabe's cronies who all acquired confiscated farms from Zimbabwe's white commercial farmers. Still in Zimbabwe, the president's wife is said to have acquired massive milk supply deals through her corruptly acquired dairy farm. In South Africa, the so-called “Arms deal scandal” almost tainted President Mbeki's government and furthermore divided his government and the ruling party on the one hand down the middle. A Commission of Inquiry is currently (2014) under way in South Africa to investigate the allegations. The most surprising part of it all is that it took President Jacob Zuma to establish the commission – the man who was heavily cited and implicated in the scandal. In addition, South Africa is still reeling from a massive scandal popularly known as “Nkandla gate” which saw President Jacob Zuma having had unduly benefited from public funds when building his homestead in his home province of KwaZulu-Natal estimated at over R248 million.

4.1.2 Sub-Saharan Africa, military dictators and corruption

From the founding fathers of the post-independence dispensation Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a second rebirth. This was through the region's new political leadership which was dispensed by military dictators.

In Ghana, Kwame Nkruma is removed from power through a bloodless coup d'état on allegations of corruption. Uganda is known the world over for producing one of the world's most famous corrupt dictator in Idi Amin. Idi Amin even went as far as printing money against economic logic. Idi Amin was the face of corruption in Uganda until he was toppled by Milton Obote. Milton Obote was removed from power through a coup d'état led by General
Yoweri Museveni of the NRM guerilla movement on allegations of massive corruption – and acts of cannibalism. From 28 January 1966, when Nigeria's first post-independence government was toppled in a coup d'état by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi, this populous West African country has had the highest number of military dictatorships in the entire region; all based on allegation of widespread graft, nepotism, tribalism and regionalism. From General Ironsi in 1966 through the successive military governments of Lt. General Yakubu Gowon, General Murtala Mohammed, General Olusegun Obasanjo, General Ibrahim Babangida, General Sani Abacha and General Abdulsalam Abubakar witnessed disappearance of billions of Nigeria's petroleum and oil revenue into the pockets of these dictators and their government bureaucrats (Adebayo, 2013). In Nigeria, General Babangida's regime refused vehemently to account for the $12.4 billion oil revenue amassed during the Gulf war (Sadiq and Abdullahi, 2013). Nigeria has lost approximately $300 billion through corruption and theft by political elites and bureaucrats since independence. President Mobuto SeSe Seko of the DRC, formerly Zaire, was removed from government through a military coup d'état by President Laurent Kabila after massive corruption incidences and authoritarianism.

4.1.3 Sub-Saharan Africa, permanent political elites and corruption

It is historical that the world has been characterised by permanent political elites who come into power differently. Some of these permanent political elites operated de facto or de jure one party states; the likes of Togo's President Eyedema, Gabon's President Bongo, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda and Cote d'Ivoire's Felix Houphouet-Boigny, just to mention a few. These political elites use the one party systems to prolong their stay in power while some arbitrarily amend constitutions to create permanent incumbencies. In addition, Africa at large has been home to numerous permanent authoritarian presidents and long-time army dictators, just as it was the case in Nigeria (Sadiq and Abdullahi, 2013). For example, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt ruled Egypt for over 30 years after ascending to power during the assassination of President Anwar Sadat before being removed from power in a bloody public revolt in the so-called Tahir Square protests by the poor after allegations of massive corruption, and so was President Ben Ali of Tunisia. Both Mubarak and Ali have been authoritarian lifetime political elites. Robert Mugabe will in all probability die as Zimbabwe's only president since independence in 1981. President Kamuzu Hastings Banda ruled Malawi for nearly 29 years until his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) lost an election to President Bakili Muluzi. President Mobuto SeSe Seko of Zaire ruled Zaire (DRC) for over 30 years.

The theory emanating from this is that Sub-Saharan Africa has been ruled by lifetime presidents and long-time army dictators for decades. Some army dictators even evolve into civilian politicians to stay in power. Examples to this include Jerry Rawlings in Ghana and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria, amongst others. Corruption became the order of the day in these regimes because political incumbents felt entitled to the resources of their respective countries (Friedman, 2007). In addition, there have been virtually no accountability and transparency during such regimes.

4.1.4 Sub-Saharan Africa, monarchism and corruption

The world's only absolute monarch is found in Sub-Saharan Africa. King Mswati the 3rd of Swaziland is the world's only absolute monarchy. The Kingdom of Swaziland has become his personal property. Corruption has devastated Swaziland to a point of bankruptcy only to be saved by South Africa and Equatorial Guinea most of the time although King Mswati lives in daily opulence with his uncountable number of wives in a country where the majority of the people live under $1 a day.

4.2 The rise of family-based political, bureaucratic and economic dynasties

Most of the political dynasties cited above created by some of the elite autocrats, dictators and authoritarians mentioned gave birth to the emergence of the so-called dynastic and personal rule in Sub-Saharan Africa where political incumbents reduced public service and administration and corporate business into family affairs of family members, regional; ethnic and tribal kinsmen (Adebayo, 2013; Bond and Manyanya, 2002). This they do in order to safeguard the benefits that accrue from political power. For example, Ali Ben Bongo (Gabon), Faure Gnassingbe (Togo), Gamal Mubarak (Egypt), Karim Wade (Senegal) and Muhozo Museveni (Uganda) all came into prominent
politics and mega business for example, in their respective countries in clandestine political elevations facilitated by their strong president fathers to perpetuate and continue their families' hegemonies in the looting and embezzlement of public resources (Mbeki, 2011).

Angola has produced the richest woman in that country and possibly the richest black African woman of all times in the daughter of President Jose dos Santos, Isabel dos Santos, who is said to have banked approximately $3 billion stolen from public resources in a country whose people live on less than $2 a day (Dolan and Marques de Morain, 2013). On the one hand, there were attempts by Malawi's now deceased President Bingu wa Mutharika to smuggle his younger brother Peter Mutharika into the country's presidency just before the former's death to keep the power within the Mutharika family. For worse or for good, Malawians nevertheless elected Peter Mutharika president of Malawi to fulfill the wishes of his deceased brother - consciously or otherwise. However it might be that Malawians lacked an alternative to dislodge Joyce Banda whose term of office was tainted by the so-called cash gate scandal.

In addition, for decades, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced massive and extensive militarism and constitutional amendments by the political elites to perpetuate corruption and political dominance (Mbeki, 2011) – and in some cases, close relatives were brought into political power through the back door to perpetuate corruption. In the DRC for example, after Laurent Kabila's assassination came in Josep Desire Kabila and sarcastically through a coup d'etat that had killed the incumbent's father.

In South Africa, how does a normal process of ethical Public Service and Administration explain the issue of a daughter of President Jacob Zuma who becomes a Chief Director managing staff of a Department within a mere two years of entry into the junior ranks of government service? (Pillay and Mataboge, 2014). This appointment has received widespread criticism from the public. It is regrettable however that the Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC) which President Jacob Zuma leads defended the appointment. Clearly, all these incidences mentioned point to the fact that corruption takes many forms in Sub-Saharan Africa; from grand, political, petty or bureaucratic, judicial and moral corruption (Sadiq and Abdullahi, 2013).

4.3 Evolution of corruption in various political and bureaucratic dispensations: Reflections

From the elaborated diary of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa post-independence, what emerges is that corruption has been evident through the various government systems; post-liberation governments led by the founding fathers such as Kwame Nkruma of Ghana, military dictatorships of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Colonel Mummar Ghadafi in Libya, authoritarians such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Malawi's Hastings Kamuzu Banda and democratic governments such as those of Olusegun Obasanjo (Second Term as Civilian) and Thabo Mbeki in South Africa, just to mention a few.

Looking at the evolution of corruption from this perspective, it becomes clear that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has been dispensational (Chipkin, 2012). In other words, the post-liberation, military dictatorships, authoritarian and constitutional democracies dispensations have all been characterised by massive corruption just as Chipkin (2012) asserted. This trend is corroborated by Uneke (2010) who opined that corruption could affect every stratum of the political system including subordinates and superiors; government and agencies alike. Clearly, corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has been an issue of greedy, immoral and unethical political leadership and bureaucratic influence as massive amounts of public resources are embezzled by these political elites and their chosen few (Dziva, 2014; Tamukamoyo, 2013; Khounou, 2011; Uneke, 2010) who employ what Alence (2004) described as "big man" politics of resource entitlement (Friedman, 2007). This assertion is corroborated by Mohandas K. Gandhi as cited in van Rensburg (2009). Political leadership has been lacking in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence. Selfless leaders such as Nelson Mandela who on his release from the Victor Verster prison after 27 years on incarceration by the National Party apartheid regime in South Africa asserted thus “I stand before you not as a prophet, but as a humble servant of you, the people. I therefore place the remaining years of my life in your hands” have largely been absent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, Sub-Saharan Africa political elites and bureaucrats were motivated by greed, not service to the poor masses of the people – who voted them into power. Corruption is a matter of choice, it has never
been compelling, and a result, political elites in this region could simply have to make a choice from their conscience – just as President Mandela did before he became president of South Africa.

Considering Camerer (2009) who argued that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa undermined public trust of government and subsequently its legitimacy, it is now clear why there has been numerous violent reactions by society against despotic and authoritarian governments such as those of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Ghadafi in Libya and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe. Mugabe had to crush some serious advancement of the civil society during the so-called food riots of 1995 in Harare to escape similar embarrassments suffered by Ghadafi and Mubarak; otherwise he would have been the first to go like Ghadafi and Mubarak.

Corruption impacts on the poor of the poorest most, and it is the poor of the poorest who organise mass protests and violent demonstrations to challenge political elites on perpetual acts of corruption. This is because corruption infringes with the ability of the political system to discharge and deliver expected public service outcome (Cakatu, 2011; Sithole, 2013) – especially where individual interests override community imperatives (van Rensburg, 2007). The fact that ordinary masses might even go to an extent of engaging the armed state security agencies such as the army and the police against corrupt regimes in violent conflicts as happened during the so-called “Arab spring” in North Africa and elsewhere in Mid-Eastern Europe posit that corruption violates and undermines democracy and human rights (Camerer, 2009) while threatening the quality of life of the poor by trapping them in a vicious cycle of illiteracy, diseases, homelessness, unemployment and underdevelopment. In reaction to these, and in frustration of the inability of state apparatus and agencies to curb corruption, the masses take matters into their own hands. This option leads to political disruptions and instability in the region – especially when coercive regimes – in protection of their political power bases that entitle them to looting and in addition safeguarding the loot meant for public well-being perpetuate violence against the protesting citizenry.

This paper posits therefore that the effects of corruption could be more devastating, and far beyond mere economic references (Alence, 2004). Some members of the public fight for political inclusion in order to gain access to public resources while others fight the political system in genuine commitment to curb corruption. Corruption has been fought in so many ways. The preceding section elaborates on some of these ways.

4.4 Fighting corruption: Measures adopted and constraints experienced

Corruption has been fought against by several stakeholders, and through various means and ways around the world. The idea of this section is not to exhaust all the anti-corruption measures adopted against corruption, and neither does the paper intend to document all the anti-corruption agencies. However, this is meant to be a brief survey of the measures and the agencies involved in anti-corruption measures around the world – especially Sub-Saharan Africa.

4.4.1 Political intervention and measures

The so-called Nkandla scandal in South Africa where President Jacob Zuma was found to have benefited unduly from the R248 million housing scandal at his rural private home by the office of the Public Protector put pressure on government, the ruling party and parliament to take measures to resolving the matter. Opposition parties made noise about it while the ruling party employed political spin-doctoring to reject advances of opposition and civil society to attack the president and the ruling party – in particular displaying the ruling party as corrupt and unwilling to address issues of corruption. Commissions and Committees were appointed to address the issue, only for such committees to be disbanded or dissolved on the way even before they could begin or complete work. In some instances, allegations of political parties benefiting from corruption (Bailey, 2014) have been common in most regions in Sub-Saharan Africa – especially when some of the resources are used to further the interests of the incumbent political formations. This is so because political party funding remains secret.

4.4.2 Mass Political Education – especially during political rallies and campaigns

Political parties engage the electorate on corruption by trying to play clean during campaigns and rallies to win the confidence of the electorate. Political parties party themselves and their leaders as clean and anti-corruption
activists. However, it is paradoxical and ironic that the political systems that seem to propagate corruption turn around to become watchdogs of corruption. In almost every political campaigns and rallies for elections in particular, politicians are heard condemning corruption in government – even if they were the incumbent government – promising the electorate some vigorous measures to remove it. Even those politicians implicated in fresh scandals of corruption put brave faces to condemn corruption. However, this becomes political rhetoric of both opposition and ruling party politics which disappears immediately after the elections in particular.

4.4.3 Legislative intervention
Laws are passed in parliament to address corruption in every country. However, it emerges that the law makers are also the breakers of the same laws they made. The so-called travel gate scandal in South Africa is an example of this assertion since it involved parliamentarians. Malawi's recent cash gate scandal was committed by high class politicians and law makers.

4.4.4 Civil Society pressure and measures
In countries where civil society is free, there has been widespread pressure on governments to act against corruption. Public media has been fundamental in exposing graft and corrupt tendencies by influential people and politicians in countries such as South Africa. Anti-corruption protests have also been some considerable intervention measures against corruption in some regions – especially in South Africa. In restrictive civil societies such as Zimbabwe where state agencies are ruthless in dealing with vocal civil society, corruption continues to be rampant and unabated.

4.4.5 Law enforcement interventions
Influential personalities have been arrested, charged and imprisoned in some cases in several countries in the region. For example, the former Commissioner of Police in South Africa, Mr Jacob Sello “Jackie” Selebi was found guilty of corruption and imprisoned for 15 years (Schwella, 2013). However, under mysterious reasons, the former Commissioner has been released on account of chronic health challenges. He was released so that he could die at home because apparently he was declared too ill to live. Some years thereafter, the former Commissioner is still alive. According to Schwella (2013), from the start, Mr Selebi had been vehemently protected by senior politicians in government. Some senior public officers were even suspended from work for insisting on criminally charging the Commissioner of Police (Schwella, 2013). Internal corruption within law enforcement agencies have also been found to defeat the objectives of law enforcement intervention measures by amongst others killings of witnesses and whistle-blowers, destruction of police dockets and deliberate poor investigative work.

4.4.6 International Political and economic pressure and sanctions
The October 2000 International Anti-corruption and Good Governance Act (P.L. 106-309) by the United States of America was developed to improve government transparency and accountability while promoting good governance on the one hand in emerging economies where the US had investments in particular. The United States government spent approximately $33 million per annum in 22 Sub-Saharan Africa countries fighting corruption in 2001-2002. The course of international interventions is however defeated by most Sub-Saharan Africa claiming sovereignty and entitlement to non-interference by foreigners – one case in point being Zimbabwe.

4.5 The emergence of, and sustaining factors of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
Obviously the tendencies to defeat anti-corruption measures sustains corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption needs the right environment and atmosphere for it to thrive. In other words, the conditions must be favourable for it to thrive. The opportunities for corruption should be available. The public service officer must associate with criminals. This section identifies and discusses factors creating the atmosphere promoting the emergence, sustenance and thriving of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.
4.5.1 Political conspiracies against political rivals

In political systems where the so-called “Big man” governance and politics (Alence, 2004) determine political survival, political conspiracies are common. There is evidence in Sub-Saharan Africa that law enforcement agencies such as police and criminal and justice systems were used by those in power “Big man” to victimise political opposition and reviles – especially those within same party formations. One case in point is the famous Jacob Zuma corruption case which was removed from prosecution on allegations of political conspiracy to subject him to a political persecution and trial. It was alleged that former president Mbeki had a hand in Zuma's corruption allegations by using state security agencies to pursue him. The allegations cost Mbeki his job as president of South Africa when he was recalled by his African National Congress (ANC) party who believed the conspiracy theory. Allegations of political conspiracies and victimisation of political rivals using state agencies; whether real or imagined undermine anti-corruption actions. All of a sudden, the culprits project themselves as victims in order to derail the due process of law. This assertion is corroborated by Mashego (2014:1) who reported that friends of convicted former Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi have launched a fight back crusade against prosecutors and senior police officers who were involved in the commissioner's investigation and his subsequent prosecution and incarceration. Within law enforcement agencies there are those who were on the side of the convicted commissioner who still felt hard done by when the commissioner was convicted. Many believe the commissioner was a victim of some political factions within the ruling party despite proof that the commissioner had during his term of office as commissioner of police received bribes from drug dealers who gave evidence against him during trial.

4.5.2 Political survival

In the Richard Nixon Scandal of 1972 – the Republican President of America, it is said that President Nixon got involved in the scandal for his re-election. Nixon tried to cover the scandal up by trying to use his political influence to raise “hush money” for the burglars who conducted the action to steal secret documents and to wiretap phones for his opposition while Nixon tried to derail the action of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), destroy evidence and purge uncooperative staff members. Though President Nixon later resigned from government, he was never prosecuted. In Sub-Saharan Africa, politicians bloat government size using ethnic identities in order to maximise their re-election into party politics and government – by deploying loyal servants – especially those from the dominant ethnic and regional groupings who would suppress minority ethnic groups in both party politics and government to ensure the hold of the political incumbent onto power (Adebayo, 2013; Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Dreher and Gassebener, 2013). This is summarised by a statement attributed to a Ugandan political activist who when referring to President Yoweri Museveni's regime in Uganda hinted thus “Corruption is the way the regime survives. The current regime is in survival mode and it depends on corruption” (Lowenstein, 2013). In South Africa for example, the so-called cadre deployment strategy is defended by political elites and senior bureaucrats who argue that to effectively transform the political economic systems in younger democracies in particular requires internally groomed cadres who would be loyal to the system – while on the one hand, such political elites find space to demonstrate their readiness to govern, and to govern through their own people posted in key positions (Biko, 2013). In some cases, the basic objective of this system is to extend access power to public resources by retaining political power first. In countries such as Nigeria for example, it took also a plethora of political coup d'état to retain political power for public resource access (Adebayo, 2013). Clearly, personal ambition to attain power, greed and dishonesty motivate corrupt individuals to fight for political survival (Cakata, 2011).

4.5.3 Businessization of politics and government

Post-independence, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa discarded their liberation rhetoric of mass emancipation through socialism to becoming business empires owned by businesses liberation veterans who owned vast productive resources such as land and other assets (Bond and Manyanya, 2002). In other words, vicious capitalism and accumulation of personal wealth led by liberation elites emerged, and this changed the socio-economic landscape in the region. In South Africa for example, the focus to curb corruption within public service and administration is to prohibit government employees from doing business with government. However, what this new
policy direction omits is that it does not have to be government employees doing business with government who promote corruption. Senior bureaucrats and political elites clandestinely get involved through tender rigging to the favour of their business connections for them to receive kickbacks (Bailey, 2014:1; 6). Business people who also support ruling party politics are also mostly the beneficiaries of this *businessization* of government systems. Sometimes fictitious companies are created to siphon public resources. Some of these companies actually render no service but still get paid huge amounts of monies (Bailey, 2014:1). The fact is that there are business persons outside government who have “connections inside senior government structures” comprising middle and senior management government employees who influence tender processes and decisions in favour of these unscrupulous business persons.

Whether the government employee has business or not, the employee becomes the beneficiary and shareholder of this *mafia* scheme to siphon public resources to dubious business deals. For example, the On-Point–Julius Malema allegations of corruption and money laundering activities largely involved business persons outside government who never had any direct influence of the tender processes and decisions. On-Point got the tenders anyhow. In addition, there are some commentators of corruption who cite poverty amongst government bureaucrats as being the cause and a factor of sustenance of corruption. This school of thought ignores the fact that big deals of corruption in state procurement and business worth billions largely involve middle and senior bureaucrats where decisions are made, not at junior levels. Middle and senior bureaucrats cannot plead poverty because they are the most highly paid personnel in public service – with some earning millions of rands *per annum* for example. However, small-scale bribes and perks might happen at lower structures of the bureaucracy, and this mostly take place through theft and sale of accessories such as medicines in hospitals for example.

4.5.4 *Infiltration of party politics and government systems by criminal individuals masquerading as business persons*

From time to time political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa have been infiltrated by individuals and syndicates of corrupt and criminal elements wanting to access the so-called internal circles or the centres of power of political elites in order to influence the disbursement of resources whenever opportunities opened up. Incidences of such dubious characters to access personal favours for political office and government contracts are widely recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa. These individuals often accessed governments through ruling political parties which they manipulate through party funding and personal favours amongst others. Incidences of political elites and bureaucrats receiving massive kickbacks through discounts on valuables such vehicles and property are very common in the political economy of this region. Unfortunately, political systems in Africa lacked ability to cleanse themselves from these characters – therefore worsening corruption (Mashele and Qobo, 2014).

4.5.5 *Cadre deployment*

South African public service has been highly characterised by cadre deployment since the dawn of democracy. From President Nelson Mandela to President Jacob Zuma, cadre deployment dominated public service in South Africa. In most cases, politically deployed cadres were people without appropriate educational levels, skills and competence (Gumede, 2014:15). According to Schwella (2013), first was President Mandela for example who deployed the chairman of the South African Breweries, Meyer Kahn who obviously lacked police background and experience as a turn-around strategic specialist of the South African Police Services. President Mbeki appointed Commissioner Jackie Selebi from outside the police as commissioner. The current Chief Operations Officer (COO) of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) is alleged to not have completed high school education. Despite numerous efforts to remove him, he continues to receive strong political protection because he serves the interests of his political masters who deployed him at the SABC. In addition, the current South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) chair is also said to have falsified her qualifications to obtain the job. Both these cases are with the courts. It is clear that the two officers at the SABC are protected by political elites who have interest in their appointments. Widespread rumours and allegations that the chair of the SABC is in fact a concubine of the president, allegations which nobody is currently refuting point to some serious corruption at the parastatal.
The cadre deployment strategy promoted the so-called collegial blind loyalty (Schwella, 2013) to the political incumbent and the ruling party at the expense of service delivery in the country (Boraine, 2014). For example, during this cadre deployment dispensation, local government systems were staffed by personnel who lacked appropriate skills and experience at local government level. Teachers, nurses and semi-illiterate appointees held senior influential positions in municipalities. Some of these cadres were appointed as municipal managers, senior managers and even mayors. Lack of appropriate skills and experience caused poor service delivery at municipal levels, and in addition serious corrupt tendencies. Some municipalities were even declared insolvent and were taken over by provincial management for administration.

However, Sebola (2014) contended that Mbeki's administration was not politicised – submitting that it is instead Zuma's administration which began the route of politicisation of public service and administration in South Africa (Sebola, 2014). Firstly, the point is not who started cadre deployment, but what cadre deployment caused in government as a whole. Secondly, pointers are there that cadre deployment was never a Zuma invention in South African public service and administration but a culture that emanated as far back as President Mandela to date.

Ill-equipped and academically unqualified deployed cadres created distortions of public service regulations in order to protect the interests of the incumbents who deployed them (Dreher and Gassebener, 2013). These cadres were often used as conduits of corrupt practices linking their masters with public resources through irregular awarding of tenders for example. This paper concedes however that we would not sufficiently advocate that non-deployment of cadres in public service and administration would have totally eradicated corruption at local government in South Africa. In other African states such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, Zambia amongst others, it is a widely known practice for presidents to cooperate with political rivals and also deploy cadres in government and major positions of public service and administration in order to gain political legitimacy, stability and consensus. But this did not halt corruption in such governments.

4.5.6 Defending those accused of corruption while attacking anti-corruption stakeholders

When political elites have their juniors as collaborators and benefactors of corruption, they receive backing. For example, in South Africa, the public protector was called derogatory names, and Buti Manamela who is a deputy minister in the current government is on national media record with his famous “Thuli Madonsela is not our God” phrase when attacking the public protector for finding against President Zuma on the so-called Nkandla gate scandal. Although Manamela's appointment into Zuma's cabinet just thereafter could not be labelled as a token for his defence of the president's corruption allegations, many commentators opined that Manamela was a benefactor of president Zuma's gratitudes on him.

On the same, the ANC Youth League leaders got even more personal calling the public protector “ugly – with a big nose” Often, those who raise anti-corruption demands or are in criticism of corruption are labelled anti-revolutionaries, enemies of the people and the movement, racists (Hyslop, 2005), dark forces of an imaginary third force. The president of South Africa calls the anti-corruption activists and commentators “clever backs” who resist black advancement; social and political change (Hyslop, 2005). The idea is to demonise such individuals and organisations in the public eye while portraying those accused of corruption as victims so that those accused of corruption gain sympathy from the ordinary members of the public. In addition, public feelings are instigated so that the ordinary people might see an imaginary enemy which is threatening the people's movement and sovereignty. In Zimbabwe for example, such critics would be labeled collaborators of America and Britain to create perception amongst the electorate of an anti-Zimbabwe agenda by those who raise their voices against elite and bureaucratic corruption.

4.5.7 Denial of existence of corruption by the leadership of the ruling party

In South Africa, the former minister of Arts and Culture Paul Mashatile is on record during the April 2014 general election debate on national television saying “it was not corruption but unauthorised expenditure” referring to an incident of reported corruption in government. It is common in South Africa for example for politicians to also
ascribe corruption to the previous apartheid government – even if it happened in modern era of democracy (Hayslop, 2005).

4.5.8 Rewarding perpetrators of corruption

Often, offenders are rewarded with promotions or redeployment to senior positions away from the crime scene in most African political systems. Sadiq and Abdullahi (2013) reported of an incidence in Nigeria during the General Babangida’s regime when imprisoned politicians accused of massive corruption were freed and their loot returned to them. In the case of South Africa, it is common to find alleged corrupt politicians having had been moved from a certain level of political responsibility to much higher positions – some even as ambassadors. For example, a provincial premier accused of maladministration and corruption is often taken to parliament or deployed as an ambassador of the republic to another country. This practice shows blatant lack of political will to punish corrupt individuals. Those who are politically well connected instead escape arrests and prosecution (Lowenstein, 2013).

4.5.9 Entitlement of the political system

This is best summarised by the famous statement alluded to by the president of the Republic of South Africa Mr Jacob Zuma who once said “we shall build this organisation. Even God expects us to rule this country because we are the only organisation which was blessed by pastors when it was formed. It is even blessed in Heaven. That is why we will rule until Jesus comes back” (Mbeki, 2011). African leadership is part of the problems (Boraine, 2014) affirming what Mbeki, (2011) submitted thus “it is the dominant political elite in any given society that determines whether a country develops or does not develop” It is again the arrogance of the political elite that exacerbates the challenges because whatever emanates from public reaction to corruption such as what happened in the North African revolts that started in Tunisia would be perceived as something that would never happen in their regions (Mbeki, 2011). Political entitlement is meant to consolidate legitimacy amongst the citizenry while using it for access to public resources. Entitlement hinders and discourages the productivity, advancement, improvement and achievement of the country as it builds socio-economic exclusion and discrimination of those perceived to be away from the traditions and the inner circle of the political elites and ruling party politics (Friedman, 2007). only those who belong or subscribe to the expectations of the dominant political elite are entitled to resource access. In Zimbabwe for example, the pro-ZANU-PF masses and its political brigade largely benefited from the so-called Fast Track Land Distribution Programme and in addition state-sponsored relief programmes during droughts.

4.5.10 Intimidation of government employees and whistle-blowers

There have been incidences of murder committed against perceived uncooperative junior staff or those in positions of power. In South Africa, cases of cadre against cadre have been widely reported in the media – and some of these cases have been with the courts for decades. Some lose their jobs as a way of removing potential evidence against them for corruption. There are also actions of counter charges laid against those who stand against certain corrupt officers. In fact, there has been lack of, and poor implementation of anti-corruption policy – especially with regard protection of employees willing to testify for example against their superiors implicated in corruption. This however is not odd in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has been known for lack of, and poor implementation of governance policy (Mafukata et al., 2014). As a result, anti-corruption strategies and measures fail because of poor implementation of policy (Faull, 2007:1).

4.5.11 Exploitation of the gaps in the laws of the country and foreign financial systems

Politicians would always say “the offender is not guilty of any corruption offence until proven so by the courts” An example is that of the Chairperson of the ANC in the Northern Cape Province John Block who despite being under trial for corruption keeps his chairpersonship in the ruling party – all because he has not as yet been found guilty by the courts. Big men who influence power direction in political formations such as political parties exploit these gaps. Demas (2011) furthermore alluded to this referring to gaps in the United States’ anti-corruption regulatory laws which condemn one corrupt African dictator such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe on the one hand while protecting another dictator in Equatorial Guinea’s Obiang Nguema on the other. Protected corrupt dictators such as Obiang
Nguema and their families exploit this lapse of law and hide their billions stolen from their countries in the United States for example; most of the times getting assistance from lawyers, bankers and real estate agencies (Demas, 2011).

4.5.12 Personal rule

Sub-Saharan Africa has been home to many tyrant leaders who behaved like gangsters who throw away statesmanship for political thuggery in order to rule as much as it could be possible (Akindele, 2005). Long-serving dictators and authoritarian political elites such as Robert Mugabe, Yoweri Museveni and Jose Do Santos and Nguema promote corruption to line their own pockets. These dictators embezzle billions of dollars intended for good course and development in their countries (Persson et al., 2010) while paying lip-service to endless promises of zero-tolerance to corruption (Tangri and Mwenda, 2006). Offenders – especially those from the deployment brigades are never punished because incumbents would want to safeguard their continuous stay in power (Tangri and Mwenda, 2006), and in addition to ensure consolidation, sustenance and survival of the rest of the political system; the ruling parties in particular who need these corrupt brigades to survive (Tangri and Mwenda, 2006). Political elites surround themselves with these kind of people who are obtained through what I call the politics of “brown envelopes” and “big money” (Stanton and Ginsberg, 2004).

4.5.13 Lack of separation of the government and the ruling party

Borraine (2014) clearly indicates the effects of the interference of ruling party politics in state affairs when citing the interference of the African National Congress (ANC) in government affairs in South Africa. Political interference lead to neopatrimonial governance with dominance of personalised political elites characterised by increased incidences of pervasive clientelism which subsequently promote privatisation of public resources (Alence, 2004), and customisation and privatisation of the citizenry (Stanton and Ginsberg, 2004) as resource-base for the political elite to exploit public resources.

4.5.14 Criminality within the policing and justice structures

Police are expected to prevent the state against corruption and to remove corruption in society because corruption stems from criminality. Evidence suggests that instead the police are infiltrated of criminal syndicates that assist criminals to perpetuate corruption. In addition, there have been deployments of supporters of corrupt public officials within anti-corruption bodies in order to protect the interests of the political elites and those corrupt individuals within government systems (Adebayo, 2013). Evidently, some elements in the police services translate into criminal mafias serving criminal interests.

4.5.15 Public action

Members of the public might play catalysts of corruption by providing incentives and rewards to public service and administration personnel through bribes and other unsolicited financial rewards in order for them to decide issues in their favour (Faull, 2007).

4.5.16 Collusion of state actors and non-state actors

In this case, the state becomes the provider of the source of power and wealth for corrupt individuals and institutions. The famous Arms Deal scandal in South Africa revealed a collusion of state and non-state actors in corruption. In the so-called Sarafina 11 scandal in South Africa's second Republic between 1994 and 1999, massive corruption was reported. This shows that corruption in South Africa in particular has not been the issue of the President Jacob Zuma's government as most commentators of corruption would like the public to believe. Corruption has been there since South Africa's first democracy and continued right through President Mbeki to the current regime.

4.5.17 Perceived non-existent enemies
This leads to views by governance and corruption commentators such as Mafunisa (2003) conceding that perceived political sabotage threats to incumbents has its conceptualisation in politicisation of public service and administration. Such commentators argue that politicisation of public service and administration has to be given space to thrive until such time that the threat has been sufficiently removed. However, the case in Sub-Saharan Africa has been that political threats never cease because most of them are manufactured, non-existent and imaginary. Political incumbents would always protest of “political conspiracy” when caught in corruption.

5. Conclusion and Implications

The main objective of this paper was to investigate chronology of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from the region's first independence in Ghana when Kwame Nkrumah became the founding president up to the time of the region's last and youngest president; Malawi's President Peter Mutharika who came into office in 2014 after defeating the incumbent Joyce Banda after the latter's corruption scandal known as cash gate in Malawi. The overarching purpose of this objective was to show that corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is historical and evolutionary and therefore making the region's governance systems generally corrupt.

A plethora of literature investigating issues of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa concurred that corruption had become endemic in the region. All the participants in this study opined that corruption is one of the greatest socioeconomic factors impeding economic emancipation, development and growth of the region's economy by squandering the already limited resources meant for the poor. Corruption has been historical from as far back as the first wave of independence in the region in the early 60s right through the other dispensations; militarism, autocracy and authoritarianism and democracy of the early 1990s. Despite efforts by various stakeholders and anti-corruption agencies to curb corruption, Sub-Saharan Africa has not as yet emerged with any comprehensive and effective instrument to address corruption in the region. Perpetrators of corruption operate in criminal cliques and syndicates squandering public resources at will. Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has shown tendencies of spilling over into ethnic manifestations which could have consequential outcomes; for example ethnic-based violence and polarised societies. Corruption mobilises civil society to act just as it happened in north Africa during the Arab spring of 2012. This paper poses this critical question “given the upsurge of corruption tendencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, whose job is it to curb such tendencies?” This question arises from the fact that there remains a huge gap in social science research pointing out with certainty, as to who bears that responsibility to resolve this critical issue. Existing literature is not conclusive yet; with some arguing governments have such responsibilities, others saying party politics should while some are advocating for a multi-stakeholder approach. This paper posits therefore that Sub-Saharan Africa might live to experience political instabilities promoted by the wanton and greedy plundering of public resources by political elites when the poor would also want to access the public resource cake. Sub-Saharan Africa has been a victim of her own leaders who elevate their self-interest above those of the general public, become greedy; self-seeking and corrupt accumulating wealth from public resources willy nilly.

Perpetrators of corruption should be arrested and prosecuted without any interference from political elites and their trusted bureaucrats who use political power to protect their friends. Pressure must be put on governments to democratise government systems by not allowing lifetime political regimes and octogenarians such as Jose do Santos, Robert Mugabe and Yoweri Museveni of Angola, Zimbabwe and Uganda respectively. While cadre deployment might not be a bad idea for some reasons – as alluded to by several scholars of political economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, its shortcoming has been that it basically undermines qualifications and skills. Only appropriately qualified cadres should be deployed to improve bureaucratic efficiency and service delivery.

References


